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FORGOTTEN FEDERALISM: THE TAKINGS CLAUSE AND
LOCAL LAND USE DECISIONS
MELVYN R. DURCHSLAG*
INTRODUCTION
Regulating land uses runs from a major activity of larger local
governments to an obsession with those that are smaller and more
rural.' These regulations take many forms, the most familiar and
venerable of which is zoning. 2 In recent years, however, a host of
other regulatory regimes have been used by local governments to re-
strict how one may use her land. These range from subdivision regu-
lations,' to attempts to preserve wetlands and open spaces,4 to historic
* Professor of Law, Case Western Reserve University School of Law. B.S., J.D., North-
western University. I thank Tom Bogart, Gerry Korngold, Bill Marshall, Andy Morriss, Bill
Pierce, and Wendy Wagner for their insightful comments on earlier drafts of this Article. I
also thank John Allotta, Stacey Boland Gaynor, and Elizabeth Rudnick for their invaluable
research assistance.
1. See generally Daniel R. Mandelker & A. Dan Tarlock, Shifting the Presumption of Consti-
tutionality in Land-Use Law, 24 URB. LAw. 1, 31-32 (1992) (analyzing local government poli-
tics in respect to land regulation).
2. See generally 1 ROBERT M. ANDERSON, AMERICAN LAW OF ZONING § 1.13, at 22 (3d ed.
1986) ("Zoning is 'a legislative act representing a legislative judgment as to how the land
within the City should be utilized and where the lines of demarcation between the several
use zones should be drawn."' (quoting City of Greeley v. Ells, 527 P.2d 538, 542 (Colo.
1974))); 1 PATRICKJ. ROHAN, ZONING AND LAND USE CONTROLS § 1.03[2] [a], at 1-23 (Eric
Damian Kelly ed., 56th ed. 1999) ("The basic concept of zoning is simple. The governing
body, with the advice of a planning commission, divides the community into districts, or
zones, and adopts land use regulations that vary by district but that are uniform within
each district.").
3. See, e.g., Timber Trails Corp. v. Planning & Zoning Comm'n, 610 A.2d 620, 624-25
(Conn. 1992) (holding that a local planning and zoning commission had the ability to take
"action on . . . [a] subdivision application when it modified the lot configuration of the
corporation's subdivision application by reducing the number of lots"); Rice v. City of Osh-
kosh, 435 N.W.2d 252, 255 (Wis. 1989) ("[tlhe governing body of the town or municipality within
which the subdivision lies may require that the subdivider make and install any public im-
provements reasonably necessary. . . ." (alteration in original) (internal quotation marks
omitted) (quoting Wis. STAT. § 236.13(2) (a) (1985))). See generally 4 ANDERSON, supra note
2, §§ 25.02-25.03, at 263-79 (describing various subdivision controls employed by different
states and jurisdictions); 7 ROHAN, supra note 2, § 45.01 [1] [a], at 45-45 (explaining that
"the primary purpose of subdivision regulation is integration of a new development into an
existing community" (citations omitted)).
4. See, e.g., Agins v. City of Tiburon, 447 U.S. 255, 261 (1980) (upholding, as legiti-
mate, zoning ordinances that "discourage the 'premature and unnecessary conversion of
open-space land to urban uses"' because the ordinances advance legitimate government
goals (quoting CAL. GoV'T CODE ANN. § 65561 (b) (West Supp. 1979))); Potomac Sand &
Gravel Co. v. Governor of Md., 293 A.2d 241, 248 (Md. 1972) (per curiam) (upholding a
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preservation efforts,5 to saving scenic views from obstruction by high-
rise buildings.6
Whatever their diversity in scope or purpose, all land use regula-
tions share two characteristics. First, they are far more likely to be
enacted by local governments than by either state governments or the
federal government.' The reason for this is simple; the immediate
statute that "prohibit[ed] ... dredging sand, gravel, or other aggregates or minerals" from
wetland areas because the statute promoted the preservation of "exhaustible natural re-
sources"). See generally I ANDERSON, supra note 2, § 2.09, at 43 (stating that "[a] growing
number of states are imposing state controls on coastal and wetland areas"); 2 ROHAN,
supra note 2, § 16.06[2] [b], at 16-195 (noting the existence of "a variety of federal and
state efforts to preserve open space").
5. See, e.g., St. Bartholomew's Church v. City of New York, 914 F.2d 348, 356-57 (2d
Cir. 1990) (finding that the application of New York City's Landmark Preservation Law to a
church did not constitute a taking); Portsmouth Advocates, Inc. v. City of Portsmouth, 587
A.2d 600, 602 (N.H. 1991) ("The protection of historic landmarks and areas is a legitimate
and recognised exercise of a town's police powers for the purpose of promoting that
town's general welfare." (citing Victorian Realty Group v. City of Nashua, 534 A.2d 381, 383
(N.H. 1987))); Carol M. Rose, Preservation and Community: New Directions in the Law of His-
torical Preservation, 33 STAN. L. REV. 473, 475-76 (1981) (suggesting that historic preserva-
tion serves important social purposes, such as building a sense of community). See generally
2 ANDERSON, supra note 2, § 9.74, at 331 (noting the "community effort to preserve the
physical evidence of history through land-use controls"); 5 RoItAN, supra note 2, § 31.01, at
31-11 (discussing various preservation efforts and noting that "[ s]tatutory encouragement
of historic preservation usually takes the form of tax incentives" (footnote omitted)).
6. See, e.g., Washington v. Pacesetter Constr. Co., Inc., 571 P.2d 196, 200 (Wash. 1977)
(upholding a 35-foot maximum height limitation on building improvements because the
"protection of aesthetic values alone justif[ies] the exercise of police power without pay-
ment of compensation" (citations omitted)); Appeal of Girsh, 263 A.2d 395, 399 (Pa. 1970)
(finding that a municipality can protect its attractive character by imposing reasonable
height restrictions). See generally 2 ANDERSON, supra note 2, § 9.55, at 270 (noting that "the
zoning enabling acts of most states specifically authorize regulations which control the
height of buildings and structures" (footnote omitted)); 7 Ro"tAN, supra note 2, § 42.02[1],
at 42-13 (stating that height restrictions "have been widely accepted as a valid exercise of
police power").
7. This is not to say that federal or state land use regulations are unheard of or even
unusual. The federal government, of course, controls land uses on federal lands. See, e.g.,
Ventura County v. Gulf Oil Corp., 601 F.2d 1080, 1086 (9th Cir. 1979) (finding congressio-
nally approved use of federal lands to be good cause for encroaching on the historic police
powers of the states). The federal government also controls land uses that "effect com-
merce." See, e.g., Hodel v. Virginia Surface Mining & Reclamation Ass'n, 452 U.S. 264, 268
(1981) (upholding the Surface Mining Act of 1977, a statute designed to "establish a na-
tionwide program to protect society and the environment from the adverse effects of sur-
face coal mining operations" as constitutional under the Commerce Clause (internal
quotation marks omitted) (quoting 30 U.S.C. § 1202(a) (1976 & Supp. III))). Land uses
that risk polluting waterways over which the federal government may exercise control are
also controlled by the federal government. See, e.g., United States v. Riverside Bayview
Homes, Inc., 474 U.S. 121, 139 (1985) (interpreting the Clean Water Act as authorizing
the Army Corps of Engineers to require permits for the discharge of fill into wetlands
adjacent to "waters of the United States" (internal quotation marks omitted)). For their
part, states tend to limit their direct land use regulation to natural resource preservation
such as environmentally sensitive coastlines and wetlands. See, e.g., Just v. Marinette
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and most felt effects of land uses are local.' The second shared char-
acteristic is that many modern land use regulatory regimes go well
beyond the nuisance prohibiting regulations first proposed in model
form by the United States Department of Commerce in the 1920s'
and approved by the United States Supreme Court in Village of Euclid
v. Ambler Realty Co.1" Modern land use regulations, even those that
take the form of traditional "zoning," are more planning tools than a
substitute remedy for common law nuisances or near nuisances. Many
County, 201 N.W.2d 761, 772 (Wis. 1972) (upholding as constitutional a local ordinance
designed to meet standards for shoreland regulation). For a case on the preservation of
scarce farmland, see, e.g., Meeker v. Board of Commissioners, 601 P.2d 804, 805 (Or. 1979),
finding county approval of agricultural land division acceptable. Virtually all other land
use regulation occurs at the local government level. Land use regulatory authority is dele-
gated by states to their local governments, either by statute, see, e.g., ALASi STAT.
§ 29.40.010 (Michie 1998), or by judicial interpretation of constitutional home rule grants,
see, e.g., City of Clinton v. Sheridan, 530 N.W.2d 690, 695 (Iowa 1995) (en banc), finding "no
irreconcilable conflict between the election laws and the initiative and referendum provi-
sions of the Clinton [, Iowa] home rule charter."
8. This is not to deny that local zoning ordinances, particularly those that impose
large minimum lot sizes, can have significant extraterritorial impacts both in terms of the
cost of housing in the broader regional market and in housing consumer location choices.
See WILLIAM A. FISCHEL, REGULATORY TAKINGS: LAw, ECONOMICS, AND POLITICS 218-52
(1995) [hereinafter REGULATORY TAKINGS] (reviewing "evidence that legal doctrines such
as regulatory takings do make a discernible difference in the use of land and its cost"); see
also WILLIAM A. FISCHEL, THE ECONOMICS OF ZONING LAws: A PROPERTY RIGHTS APPROACH
TO AMERICAN LAND USE CONTROLS § 4.5, at 67 (1985) [hereinafter ECONOMICS OF ZONING
LAw] (surveying the many ways in which zoning restricts residential development and in-
creases costs); MADELYN GLICKFELD & NED LEVINE, REGIONAL GROWTH . . . LOCAL REACTION:
THE ENACTMENT AND EFFECTS OF LOCAL GROWTH CONTROL AND MANAGEMENT MEASURES IN
CALIFORNIA 2743 (1992) (examining California's use of land use controls to curtain popu-
lation growth); IRA S. LoWRy & BRUCE W. FERGUSON, DEVELOPMENT REGULATIONS AND
HOUSING AFFORDABILITY 1 (1992) (noting that zoning regulations may "limit the amount of
housing and other space available"); THOMAS K. RUDEL, SITUATIONS AND STRATEGIES IN
AMERICAN LAND-UsE PLANNING 1 (1989) (discussing how, between 1950 and 1980, a "wave
of land-use conversion created opportunities" such as "increased land values for landown-
ers, improved locations for businesses, and new, well-built, affordable homes for
homeowners").
9. See A STANDARD STATE ZONING ENABLING ACT, Advisory Committee on Zoning 6
(U.S. Department of Commerce 1926) (listing, among the purposes of the Act, general
goals such as the promotion of "health and the general welfare"); A STANDARD CITY PLAN-
NING ENABLING ACT, Advisory Committee on Planning and Zoning 11 (U.S. Department of
Commerce 1926); see also 9 ROHAN, supra note 2, § 53A.01 [1] (describing the historical
context of the two Acts).
10. 272 U.S. 365, 397 (1926) (holding that the nuisance-restrictive ordinance was a
valid exercise of local police power). The Court did, however, recognize that both Euclid's
ordinance and its holding went beyond preventing common law nuisances: "it may ...
happen that not only offensive or dangerous industries will be excluded, but those which
are neither offensive nor dangerous will share the same fate." Id. at 388. On the other
hand, the Court did note that the inconsistency between residential uses and industrial or
commercial uses created sufficient environmental dangers to sustain the ordinance as rea-
sonable. See id. at 394-95.
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local land use regulations attempt to ensure a sufficient tax base to
support local schools and other public services," t to preserve a "rural
life style"' 2 or to save farmland from development pressures.1 3
Land use regulations that focus on the future of the community
at large, those that attempt to define its character if you will, arguably
view land differently and impose a different order of burden on land-
owners than those focusing on protecting neighboring land owners
from locally undesirable land uses. When used as a planning device,
zoning tends to view land as a community resource and its use there-
fore as integral to the future character of the local community as its
public infrastructure and its educational facilities. Moreover, there is
an intuitive difference between land use regulations designed to pre-
vent harms and those designed either to preserve existing community
amenities or to ensure future amenities. 4 A traditional, harm-
preventing zoning ordinance may result in a significant reduction in
the land's value; 5 it may even render the property valueless.1 6 But
11. See I ANDERSON, supra note 2, § 7.30, at 772-74 ("The zoning enabling statutes of a
few states expressly state that zoning regulations may be adopted to protect the tax base of
the community." (citations omitted)); 6 RoIAN, supra note 2, § 34.03[6], at 34-93 ("Most
zoning enabling acts follow the language of the Standard Zoning Enabling Act, which pro-
vides that zoning regulations shall be designed 'to facilitate the adequate provision of
transportation, water, sewage, schools, parks and other public requirements.'" (citations
omitted)); see, e.g., Steel Hill Dev., Inc. v. Town of Sanbornton, 469 F.2d 956, 961 (1st Cir.
1972) (permitting an ordinance requiring three and six acre lots to consider the financial
burdens on police, sewer, road, and fire services). But see, e.g., Horn Constr. Co. v. Town of
Hempstead, 245 N.Y.S.2d 614, 620 (App. Div. 1963) (finding that prevention of an increase
in the school population and at the same time increasing the tax income of the school
district are "praise-worthy objective[s]," but they cannot be achieved by immunizing prop-
erty from "any reasonable use in the foreseeable future" (citation omitted)).
12. See 1 ANDERSON, supra note 2, § 7.06, at 697-99 ("Zoning Regulations may be
adopted for the purpose of preventing the overcrowding of land and insuring against un-
due concentration of population."); 6 RoHAN, supra note 2, § 34.02[1] [b], at 34-29 ("Two
... valid objectives of zoning enabling legislation are prevention of overcrowding of land
and ensuring against undue concentration of population." (citing Kransteuber v. Scheyer,
574 N.Y.S.2d 968 (App. Div. 1991))); see, e.g., Cohen v. City of Des Plaines, 8 F.3d 484, 494
(7th Cir. 1993) (finding that "[a] city may use zoning regulations as an exercise of the
police power to protect residents from the ill effects of urbanization"); Nopro Co. v. Cherry
Hills Village, 504 P.2d 344, 349 (Colo. 1972) (upholding an ordinance that required large
building lots in the center of the village because it was reasonably calculated to promote
the statutorily authorized objective of maintaining the rural atmosphere of the village).
13. See infra note 244 and accompanying text.
14. But cf Lucas v. South Carolina Coastal Council, 505 U.S. 1003, 1026 (1992) (re-
jecting the prevention of harm/conference of benefits distinction in Takings Clause analy-
sis); Jed Rubenfeld, Usings, 102 YALE L.J. 1077, 1097-1100 (1993) [hereinafter Usings]
(describing the incoherence of using harm prevention as a basis for distinguishing those
regulations that are subject to the Takings Clause and those that are not).
15. See, e.g., Amber Realty Co., 272 U.S. at 384-85 (discussing how the value of one prop-
erty would drop substantially if its use was restricted to residential purposes).
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the regulated landowner is likely to evoke little sympathy if those liv-
ing in the same neighborhood can demonstrate that the proposed
land use will increase traffic thus endangering their children or will
expose them to excessive noise during times when quiet is preferred.
On the other hand, the argument for regulation evokes somewhat less
sympathy when the only disagreement is whether the community
ought to be a bedroom community with only limited commercial facil-
ities 1 7 or a community with a mix of residential, commercial, and light
industrial uses." The sympathy may be all but gone if residents who
have homes on two acre parcels wish to maintain their rural life style
by down-zoning the remaining land in the community to five acre
lots. 19
When a landowner is aggrieved by land use regulations, her cur-
rent means of redress is the Takings Clause.2" The Takings Clause is a
16. See, e.g., Miller v. Schoene, 276 U.S. 272, 277 (1928) (examining a Virginia statute
that rendered valueless ornamental red cedar trees by requiring their destruction).
17. See, e.g., Schad v. Borough of Mount Ephraim, 452 U.S. 61, 85-86 (1981) (Burger,
C.J., dissenting) (suggesting that a "'bedroom' community of a few thousand people"
ought to be permitted to pass "broad regulation prohibiting certain forms of
entertainment").
18. See, e.g., id. at 83 (Stevens, J., concurring) (distinguishing, for purposes of regula-
tion, between a business that "introduced cacophony into a tranquil setting or merely a
new refrain" in an already partially commercial district).
19. Cf Mugler v. Kansas, 123 U.S. 623, 669 (1887) (finding that a statute prohibiting
the manufacture, sale, and bartering of alcohol did "not disturb the owner in control or
use of his property for lawful purposes, nor restrict his right to dispose of it, but is only a
declaration by the State that its use by anyone, for certain forbidden purposes, is prejudi-
cial to the public interests").
The "common sensible" difference between regulations that prevent harms and those
that confer benefits is what Professor Bruce Ackerman has described as the "Layman's
view" of compensable takings, embodied in the law by judges acting as "Ordinary Observ-
ers." BRUCE A. AcIRMAN, PRIVATE PROPERTY AND THE CONSTITUTION 116-29 (1977). Acker-
man did not suggest that "Layman's" analysis ought to control the takings doctrine. See id.
at 156 (discussing the Takings Clause in "its singlest form" and contending that an exten-
sion of the "Layman's view" is necessary to fully understand takings law). Quite the con-
trary, he argued that the concept of property itself, to say nothing of how one determines
whether property has been taken, is far too nuanced to rely on such a simplistic analysis.
See id. at 166. However, "Layman's" analysis is, as a descriptive matter, often used byjudges
in deciding takings cases. See id. at 156 (citing, as an example, Pennsylvania Coal Co. v.
Mahon, 260 U.S. 343 (1922)). Indeed, as I read Professor Ackerman, a more theoretically
consistent view, what he calls the "Comprehensive View," will never completely displace the
more intuitive and thus less coherent view of the "Ordinary Observer." Nor should it. See
id. at 11, 176-83.
20. See U.S. CONST. amend. V (requiring that "private property [shall not] be taken for
public use without just compensation"). The Takings Clause was applied to the states
through the Due Process Clause of the Fourteenth Amendment in Chicago, Burlington &
Quincy t R Co. v. Chicago, 166 U.S. 226 (1897). While several years a trend does not make,
it might well be that the Takings Clause will displace the Due Process Clause in property
deprivation cases much like the Due Process Clause displaced the Privileges or Immunities
[VOL. 59:464
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recent intruder in local land use disputes. Until 1922, it was generally
assumed that the Takings Clause applied only to physical appropria-
tions of property. 2' That assumption was changed in Pennsylvania Coal
Co. v. Mahon,2 2 in which the Court held that the Takings Clause (not
the Due Process Clause) applied to regulations that went "too far."23
According to Justice Holmes, when a regulation went too far was to be
determined by balancing the regulatory burdens imposed on the indi-
vidual with the interests of the regulating community.24 But it would
Clause after the Slaughter-House Cases, 83 U.S. (16 Wall.) 36 (1873). Certainly the Court's
decision in Eastern Enterprises v. Apfel, 524 U.S. 498, 504 (1998), which concluded that the
Coal Act effected an unconstitutional taking, is a clear step in that direction, despite the
language that seems to limit its scope to very narrowly focused, retroactive legislation. See
id. at 537 (noting the Coal Act's "severely retroactive impact" and "expressling] concerns
about using the Due Process Clause to invalidate economic legislation" (citations
omitted)).
21. See MORTONJ. HORWITZ, THE TRANSFORMATION OF AMERICAN LAW, 1780-1860, at 72
(1977) (explaining that during the nineteenth century, 'judges began to develop a distinc-
tion between immediate and consequential injuries, so that ... injurious acts that were
neither direct trespasses to land nor actual appropriations for public use were often held
to be noncompensable"); Joseph M. Cormack, Legal Concepts in Cases of Eminent Domain, 41
YALE L.J. 221, 221-34 (1931) (discussing the Takings Clause and its original application as a
physical concept); cf James L. Kainen, Nineteenth Century Interpretations of the Federal Contract
Clause: The Transformation from Vested to Substantive Rights Against the State, 31 Buw. L. REv.
381, 401 (1982) (noting more generally that "the constitutional arguments of the early and
late nineteenth century were about whether a party had a vested or substantive right
against the state"); Rubenfeld, Usings, supra note 14, at 1082-83 (noting that "[a]lthough
early compensation doctrine is often characterized as adhering to a strictly 'physical' un-
derstanding of property ... the idea of physicalism is not adequate to account for a signifi-
cant strand running through the case law during this period" (footnote omitted));
Stephen A. Siegel, Understanding the Nineteenth Century Contract Clause: The Role of the Prop-
erty-Privilege Distinction and "Takings" Clause Jurisprudence, 60 S. CAL. L. REv. 1, 76-81 (1986)
(analyzing nineteenth century judicial application of the Takings Clause and noting that,
at that time, "the constitution protected possession only, and not value"); Scott M. Reznick,
Comment, Land Use Regulation and the Concept of Takings in Nineteenth Century America, 40 U.
CHI. L. REv. 854, 854-58 (1973) ("The financial benefits of the possession of eminent do-
main power were increased by a doctrinal development-the narrowing of the definition
of compensable takings through the conceptualization of property as physical objects.").
22. 260 U.S. 393 (1922).
23. See id. at 415 ("The general rule at least is, that while property may be regulated to
a certain extent, if regulation goes too far, it will be recognized as a taking.").
24. See id. at 413 ("The greatest weight is given to the judgment of the legislature, but it
always is open to interested parties to contend that the legislature has gone beyond its
constitutional power."); see also United States v. Riverside Bayview Homes, Inc., 474 U.S.
121, 126 (1985) (reiterating that "the application of landuse regulations to a particular
piece of property is a taking only 'if the ordinance does not substantially advance legiti-
mate state interests ... or denies an owner economically viable use of his land"' (quoting
Agins v. Tiburon, 447 U.S. 255, 260 (1980))); Agins, 447 U.S. at 260-61 ("The application of
a general zoning law to particular property effects a taking if the ordinance does not sub-
stantially advance state interests... or denies an owner economically viable use of his land
.... (citations omitted)); Kaiser Aetna v. United States, 444 U.S. 164, 175 (1979) (stating
that the Court "has examined the 'taking' question by engaging in essentially ad hoc, fac-
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be sixty-five years before the Court would next hold that a land use
regulation violated the Takings Clause. Heeding the persistent calls
of some academics2 5 and several dissenting Supreme Court Justices,
26
the Court lured the regulatory takings dragon from its cave in Nollan
tual inquiries that have identified several factors-such as the economic impact of the
regulation, its interference with reasonable investment backed expectations, and the char-
acter of the governmental action-that have particular significance" (citing Penn Cent.
Transp. Co. v. New York, 438 U.S. 104, 124 (1978))); Penn Cent. Transp. Co., 438 U.S. at
115-16 (examining the diminution in a particular property's value that was produced by a
municipal ordinance in light of the total value of the takings claimant's other holdings in
the vicinity); DANIEL R. MANDELKER, LAND USE LAW § 2.11, at 29 (3d ed. 1993) (noting that
.some commentators believe Uustice Holmes] adopted a balancing test to decide this ques-
tion" and describing the apparent test); Frank Michelman, Takings, 1987, 88 COLUM. L.
REv. 1600, 1614 (1988) [hereinafter Takings, 1987] ("[L]and-use regulation can be charac-
terized as the 'total' deprivation of an aptly defined entitlement .... [A]lternatively, the
same regulation can always be characterized as a mere 'partial' withdrawal from full, unen-
cumbered ownership of the land-holding affected by the regulation .... ."); Carol M. Rose,
Takings, Federalism, Norms, 105 YALE L.J. 1121, 1124-30 (1996) [hereinafter Takings, Federal-
ism, Norms] (reviewing WILLIAM FISCHEL, REGULATORY TAKINGS: LAW, ECONOMICS, AND POLI-
TICS (1995) and its arguments for balancing the regulatory burden). But see Robert
Brauneis, "The Foundation of Our 'Regulatory Takings'Jurisprudence"* The Myth and Meaning of
Justice Holmes' Opinion in Pennsylvania Coal Co. v. Mahon, 106 YALE L.J. 613, 617, 657-60
(1996) (arguing that Mahon was not a balancing case or a 'diminution in value' case).
According to Brauneis, Mahon was not a Takings Clause case at all. See id. at 701. Rather,
when unpacked, it was a complex expression ofJustice Holmes's views of the constitutional
law of property. See id.
25. Professor Richard Epstein has been the leading spokesperson for vigorous judicial
enforcement of the Takings Clause. See, e.g., RICHARD EPSTEIN, TAKINGS: PRIVATE PROPERTY
& THE POWER OF EMINENT DOMAIN (1985) [hereinafter TAKINGS]. See also Douglas W.
Kmiec, Inserting the Last Remaining Pieces into the Takings Puzzle, 38 WM. & MARY L. REv. 995,
995-99 (1997) (contending that the Takings Clause cases "perpetuate an overly deferential
standard of review and proof burdens that undermine the goal of fairly balancing the
reciprocally defined concepts of property & police power"); Saul Levmore, Just Compensa-
tion andJust Politics, 22 CONN. L. REv. 285, 285-93, 308-11 (1990) [hereinafter Just Compensa-
tion] (advocating that the Takings Clause be viewed as "sensitive to the ease with which
those who endure politically imposed burdens can bargain within the political arena").
26. See, e.g., San Diego Gas & Elec. Co. v. City of San Diego, 450 U.S. 621, 648 (1981)
(Brennan, J., dissenting) (noting that "[o]n many other occasions, the Court has recog-
nized in passing the vitality of the general principle that a regulation can effect a Fifth
Amendment 'taking'" and condemning the Court for not applying the Takings Clause in
this case (citations omitted)); United States Trust Co. v. NewJersey, 431 U.S. 1, 60 (1977)
(Brennan, J., dissenting) (reminding the Court that "the command of the Fifth Amend-
ment that 'private property [shall not] be taken for public use without just compensation'
also 'remains a part of our written Constitution'" (alteration in original) (citations omit-
ted)); El Paso v. Simmons, 379 U.S. 497, 528 (1965) (Black, J., dissenting) (criticizing the
Court for "subvert[ing] the protection of . . . the Fifth and Fourteenth Amendments'
prohibitions against taking private property for public use without just compensation" and
stating that "the Court has... imported into this constitutional field what I believe to be a
constitutionally insupportable due process 'balancing' technique to which I have objected
in cases arising under the Due Process Clauses of the Fifth and Fourteenth Amendments"
(citations omitted)).
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v. California Coastal Commission.27 Nollan struck down a regulation of
the California Coastal Commission that required, as a condition to
issuing a building permit, that the landowners allow public access
across their private beachfront. 2' Nollan is, however, a minor blip on
the takings radar screen. While the land use restriction took the form
of a regulation, its effect was to exact a conditional physical taking.
29
Consequently, the only question in Nollan was whether "requiring [a
public easement] to be conveyed as a condition for issuing a land-use
permit" negates the requirement for compensation.3" Treating Nollan
as a case of the state's attempt to gain access to the Nollan's private
property, i.e., as a physical takings case, the balancing described by
the Mahon case was not applicable; the only question was the value of
the easement.
31
It was not until five years after Nollan and seventy years after
Mahon that the Supreme Court declared a land use regulation simplic-
iter had gone "too far" and thus violated the Takings Clause. In Lucas
v. South Carolina Coastal Council,32 the Court declared that a regulation
that prohibited development within a certain distance from the shore
to prevent further beach erosion along the sea coast of South Caro-
lina's Barrier Islands violated the Takings Clause. 33 Following Nollan's
analysis, rather than the language of Mahon, the Court did not bal-
ance the state's interest in preventing further beach erosion and the
contribution of additional building to that erosion against the loss to
27. 483 U.S. 825 (1987).
28. See id. at 829.
29. See Michelman, Takings, 1987, supra note 24, at 1612 (pointing out that the Nollan
opinion defined "taking" as no more than a physical occupation). On the other hand,
Nollan made clear that the right to build on one's property is not simply a "governmental
benefit;" rather, it inheres in the title itself. Nollan, 483 U.S. at 833 n.2.
30. Nollan, 483 U.S. at 834.
31. Cf Loretto v. Teleprompter Manhattan CATV Corp., 458 U.& 419, 441 (1982) (ap-
plying a per se rule to physical takings, whatever the value of the property from which the
owner is deprived of physical control). But cf. id. at 442-43 (Blackmun, J., dissenting) (ob-
jecting to the majority's abandonment of the Court's traditional balancing approach).
The only balancing that seemingly occurs in conditional physical dispossession cases is
consideration of whether the conditional enactment is "proportional" to the public harm
that is likely to occur from the landowner's planned use. See Dolan v. City of Tigard, 512
U.S. 374, 391 (1994). This tit for tat formula is not the same balancing Justice Holmes had
in mind in Pennsylvania Coal Co. v. Mahon, 260 U.S. 393 (1922) in determining whether a
regulation has gone "too far," id. at 413, nor does it resemble the balancing engaged in by
the Court in Penn Central Transportation Co. v. New York City, 438 U.S. 104, 124 (1978).
32. 505 U.S. 1003 (1992).
33. Id. at 1006-09, 1032.
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the landowner to reach the result it did. 4 Rather, it rejected its previ-
ous balancing approach in favor of a per se takings rule.35
Scholars have weighed in on both sides of the Court's post-1987,
revitalized Takings Clause.3 6 It is no wonder. Since the Due Process
Clause no longer defines the line between private property and public
authority3 7 the Takings Clause remains the only constitutional obsta-
cle to the legislature's treating land "as part of an ecosystem, rather
than as purely private property."3 8 However, the place private prop-
erty deserves in our hierarchy of values, while certainly germane, is
34. See id. at 1014-15.
35. See id. at 1019 (stating that "when the owner of real property has been called upon
to sacrifice all economically beneficial uses in the name of the common good, that is, to
leave his property economically idle, he has suffered a taking" (footnote omitted)).
36. See Pat A. Cerundolo, The Limited Impact of Lucas v. South Carolina Coastal Council
on Massachusetts Regulatory Takings Jurisprudence, 25 B.C. ENVrL. AFF. L. REV. 431, 484 (1998)
(concluding that "in the context of Massachusetts' common law nuisance principles, Lucas
may in fact provide a useful avenue for land-use regulators to better shield themselves from
regulatory takings liability"); Robert H. Freilich & Elizabeth A. Garvin, Takings After Lucas:
Growth Management, Planning, and Regulatory Implementation Will Work Better Than Before, 22
STETSON L. REV. 409, 409 (1993) ("Lucas actually will assist local government in making
planning and regulatory implementation work better than before."); Douglas W. Kmiec, At
Last, The Supreme Court Solves the Takings Puzzle, 19 HARv.J.L. & PuB. POL'Y 147, 147 (1995)
(suggesting that "with the Court's decision in Dolan v. City of Tigard, the Court largely has
solved the takings puzzle" (citation omitted)); Paula 0. Murray, Private Takings of Endan-
gered Species as Public Nuisance: Lucas v. South Carolina Coastal Council and the Endangered
Species Act, 12 UCLAJ. ENVrL. L. & POL'v 119, 136 (1993) (arguing that "the Court has not
clarified the law of takings, but created a new level of confusion"); Jamee Jordan Patterson,
California Land Use Regulation Post Lucas: The History and Evolution of Nuisance and Public
Property Laws Portend Little Impact in Calfornia, 11 UCLA J. ENVTL. L. & POL'Y 175, 175
(1993) (stating that "instead of clarifying this rather specialized field of law, the Court
perpetuated the chaos through its long awaited decision in Lucas"); Rubenfeld, Usings,
supra note 14, at 1080 ("In Lucas, a decision purportedly establishing a new bright-line rule
to resolve certain takings difficulties, the Court actually has added yet another tortuous
knot to an already convoluted doctrine." (footnote omitted)).
37. See Nebbia v. New York, 291 U.S. 502, 539 (1934) (permitting broad regulation by
the state to control the price of milk, instead of leaving the price to be determined by
market forces). But cf. Ronald J. Krotoszynski, Jr., Fundamental Property Rights, 85 GEO. L. J.
555, 557 (1997) (arguing that one's reputation is a property interest and, as a property
interest, ought to be protected by the Due Process Clause to the same degree as a liberty
interest); Frank I. Michelman, Property, Federalism, and Jurisprudence: A Comment on Lucas
and Judicial Conservatism, 35 WM. & MARY L. REv. 301, 320-24 (1993) [hereinafter Property,
Federalism and Jurisprudence] (suggesting that one reading of Lucas is that the legal concept
of property contains a constitutionally irreducible minimum derived either from 'natural
law' or historical understandings); Rubenfeld, Usings, supra note 14, at 1097-1111 (arguing
that the Court's current takings jurisprudence has incorporated "fundamental rights logic"
into the takings analysis).
38. Joseph L. Sax, Property Rights and the Economy of Nature: Understanding Lucas v. South
Carolina Coastal Council, 45 STAN. L. REv. 1433, 1438 (1993). Cf Just v. Marinette County,
201 N.W.2d 761, 772 (Wis. 1972) (upholding a local ordinance that required a landowner
to use wetlands he owned only for natural purposes such as hunting, fishing, and crops
that grow naturally on such wetlands).
[VOL. 59:464
THE TAKINGS CLAUSE AND LoCAL LAND USE
not the only factor that ought to determine the outcome of a zoning
dispute. It does not alone determine the latitude that federal courts
ought to give to local legislative bodies in distinguishing those land
uses that are, to that community, tolerable from those that are not. In-
deed, my argument is that more than other rights protecting provi-
sions, when the Takings Clause is applied to local land use regulation,
it must be tempered with a concern for federalism.
Attempts to square takings doctrine with federalism concerns is a
much written-about topic. Most prominently, Professors Frank
Michelman39 and Carol M. Rose,4" have raised distinct (from each
other) questions about how the current Court has resolved the evi-
dent conflict between protecting private property from "excessive"
state regulation and preserving the states' role in regulating land uses.
Building on the insights of both, I argue that the Court must apply the
same version of "Our Federalism"41 to the Takings Clause as it does to
the Liberty Clause. I do not reach this conclusion easily because I do
not ordinarily advocate that basic liberties be modified in the name of
federalism values.42 But as I hope to demonstrate, land use regulation
is a, if not the, leading candidate for an exception.
The next part explores the two impediments when accounting
for federalism values in assessing local zoning regulations under the
Takings Clause. The first is the Court's current takings doctrine. The
second is more theoretical. This impediment results from viewing the
Takings Clause as protecting "process" rather than "substantive" val-
ues. Part II will then explore the aspect of takings ignored by the
current Court and the "process" theorists, federalism. It will consider
what are the values protected by federalism, how those values affect
substantive constitutional liberties in contexts other than takings, and
whether the federalism balancing that is so much a part of how the
Court decides the scope and breadth of liberty interests can and
should be incorporated into the Court's Takings Clause analysis. Fi-
39. See Michelman, Property, Federalism, and Jurisprudence, supra note 37.
40. See Rose, Takings, Federalism, Norms, supra note 24.
41. The phrase "Our Federalism" comes from Justice Black's majority opinion in
Younger v. Harris, 401 U.S. 37, 44 (1971). As understood by Justice Black, "Our Federalism"
described the federal judiciary's obligation to respect "the legitimate interests of both State
and National Governments, and in which the National Government, anxious though it may
be to vindicate and protect federal rights and federal interests, always endeavors to do so in
ways that will not unduly interfere with the legitimate activities of the States." Id. at 44.
42. See Melvyn R. Durchslag, Federalism and Constitutional Liberties: Varying the Remedy To
Save The Right, 54 N.Y.U. L. Rv. 723, 724 (1979) [hereinafter Federalism and Constitutional
Liberties] (arguing that "if any accommodation is to be reached between the protection of
individual liberties and the presentation of the autonomy of state and local institutions, it
ought to be reached remedially and not substantively").
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nally, the inquiry moves from the ordinary Takings Clause plaintiffs,
the regulated landowners, to housing consumers. More particularly,
this part analyzes the problem of (for want of a more descriptive
term) "exclusionary zoning" and whether the Takings Clause is, as
some have claimed, a necessary surrogate remedy to protect the con-
sumer or whether, consistent with concerns for preserving local au-
tonomy, state law remedies are adequate.
I. IMPEDIMENTS TO FEDERALISM BALANCING
A. Takings Doctrine
It is certainly not necessary at this late date to rehash Lucas v.
South Carolina Coastal Council.4" For present purposes it is enough to
emphasize three aspects of the case. First, Lucas put a stop to the
open-ended balancing approach to takings.44 Second, Lucas held that
land use regulations will constitute a taking when "the owner ... has
been called to sacrifice all economically beneficial use in the name of
the common good."45 Finally, in that event, the regulating agency can
avoid paying compensation only if it can demonstrate "that the pro-
scribed use interests were not part of [the owner's] title to begin
with."4 6 Whether a proscribed use interest inheres in the title itself is
determined solely by reference to the state's common law of
nuisance.4
7
Most obviously Lucas relegates the policy making organ of gov-
ernment, the legislature, to a secondary role at best. Its conclusions,
even its findings, with respect to what land uses are sufficiently "harm-
ful" to justify regulation and the degree of regulation necessary to
overcome that "harm" are entitled to no deference whatsoever.48
43. 505 U.S. 1003 (1992).
44. See id. at 1019; see also supra note 35 (quoting Lucas). This approach had reached
its apex in Penn Central Transportation Co. v. New York City, 438 U.S. 104 (1978). See supra
notes 24-31 and accompanying text.
45. Lucas, 505 U.S. at 1019. See id. at 1017 ("[Flor what is the land but the profits
thereof[?]" (internal quotation marks omitted) (quoting 1 E. Coa, INSTITUTES, ch. 1, § I
(1st Am. ed. 1812))).
46. Lucas, 505 U.S. at 1027.
47. See id. at 1029 ("Any limitation so severe cannot be newly legislated or decreed
(without compensation), but must inhere in the title itself, in the restrictions that back-
ground principles of the State's law of property and nuisance already place upon land
ownership."). The Court did offer some flexibility by suggesting that "changed circum-
stances or new knowledge" could justify some variance from the strict common law of nui-
sance, but it did so only parenthetically and then by way of citation to the Restatement of
Torts. Id. at 1031.
48. Cf id. at 1035 (Kennedy, J., concurring) ("The common law of nuisance is too
narrow a confine for the exercise of regulatory power in a complex and interdependent
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Viewed differently, Lucas holds either that a state's common law of
nuisance has acquired substantive constitutional status 49 or, more
likely, there is some irreducible minimum property right defined, not
by the state, but by either the federal constitution or by federal com-
mon law.5°
If it were clear that Lucas's per se takings rule would continue to
be limited to those situations in which a land use regulation deprives a
landowner of all "economically beneficial or productive use of land"51
the opinion would be far less problematic for federalism. Rendering
property valueless undoubtedly crosses the opaque line that separates
physical takings from the state's police power.5 2 Moreover, because
regulation can be used as an inexpensive way of acquiring a public
use, Justice Scalia has a point that one should at least be suspicious of
the government's motive when regulation squeezes from property all
its economic value.5 There are hints, however, that at least some of
those who made up the Lucas majority are not content to leave pre-
sumptive takings there. The first is found in Lucas itself. After stating
the "rule," Justice Scalia appended a footnote: "Regrettably, the rhe-
torical force of our 'deprivation of all economically feasible use' rule
society. The State should not be prevented from enacting new regulatory initiatives in
response to changing conditions, and courts must consider all reasonable expectations
whatever their source." (citations omitted)).
49. Cf EPSTEIN, TAKINGS, supra note 25, at 127 (suggesting that "[t]he problems of the
private area [of nuisance abatement] have inescapable consequences for the structure of
constitutional law"); Cass R. Sunstein, Lochner's Legacy, 87 COLUM. L. REv. 873, 890 (1987)
(noting the Contracts and Takings Clauses' "incorporation of the status quo and of com-
mon law principles"); id. at 913 (stating that the Takings Clause "was built on a belief in
the meaning and importance of private property").
50. Michelman, Property, Federalism, and Jurisprudence, supra note 37, at 320 (suggesting
that "[t]here could be a uniformly binding American background property law" which is
specifically federal constitutional law).
51. Lucas, 505 U.S. at 1015 (citations omitted). For the view that Lucas is a narrow
holding because it is limited to regulations that deprive the landowner of all economic
value, see Sax, supra note 38, at 1437-39 (1993). Believing that Lucas stops well short of
where it should, Richard Epstein severely criticizes Lucas. Richard A. Epstein, Lucas v.
South Carolina Coastal Commission: A Tangled Web of Expectations, 45 STAN. L. REv. 1369
(1993).
52. See Lucas, 505 U.S. at 1017 (stating that "[p]erhaps... total deprivation of benefi-
cial use is, from the landowner's point of view, the equivalent of a physical appropriation"
(citation omitted)).
53. See id. at 1018 (noting that "regulations that leave the owner of land without eco-
nomically beneficial or productive options for its use... carry with them a heightened risk
that private property is being pressed into some form of public service under the guise of
mitigating serious public harm" (citation omitted)). But cf Miller v. Schoene, 276 U.S.
272, 278-79 (1928) (finding that the destruction of a plaintiffs cedar trees was justified on
the ground that they caused disease to neighboring apple orchards and that the state
could reasonably prefer the more profitable apple trees to the more decorative cedar
trees).
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is greater than its precision. ' 4 He then described the "denominator"
problem, the base from which the determination of the extent of the
economic deprivation is to be measured. 5 If, as Justice Stevens
feared, a developer can create separate contiguous parcels and stage
their development, she can recover for regulations that severely re-
strict development of one parcel despite turning a healthy profit on
the balance.56 Admittedly, the denominator problem may be a red
herring; it is somewhat of a technicality and can be dealt with as a
factual matter on a case-by-case basis. Two recent cases, however, may
pose more serious difficulties.
In Suitum v. Tahoe Regional Planning Agency5 7 the Court was faced
with a familiar, albeit difficult, procedural problem-whether a tak-
ings claim was ripe for determination.5" Justice Scalia, joined by Jus-
tices O'Connor and Thomas, concurred with the Court's judgment
that the claim was ripe, but in doing so, commented that "a regulatory
taking generally does not occur so long as the land retains substantial
(albeit not its full) value."59 Given the context in which the statement
was made (the ripeness of the claim), it is difficult to know what to
make of his apparent modification of Lucas's "all economic value"
standard, particularly since the majority did not in any way respond.
That it can be read in the future to expand the category of per se
takings to include regulations that reduce land values substantially
cannot, however, be dismissed out of hand. And if the Court does
expand Lucas to include even significant, albeit not total, land value
degradations, the range of land use policy options available to local
governments will be dramatically reduced, either because some op-
54. Lucas, 505 U.S. at 1016 n.7.
55. See id. at 1016-17 n.7. The denominator problem can be simply illustrated. If one
owns 100 acres, 20 of which have a protected wetland on which development is prohibited,
the question is whether the denominator is 100 acres, the total parcel, or the 20 acres on
which development is prohibited. For a comprehensive review of how lower federal and
state courts have dealt with the denominator issue, as well as a general critique of the
various approaches, see STEVENJ. EAGLE, REGULATORY TAKINGS 329-44 (1996). The denom-
inator problem is explored further infra notes 67, 172.
56. See Lucas, 505 U.S. at 1065-66 (Stevens, J., dissenting) (expressing the dangers of
landowner manipulation of his development plan to create a lower denominator). The
state court in Penn Central had an answer to the question of how to measure the denomina-
tor; it included all of the individual's holdings. See Penn Central Transp. Co. v. City of New
York, 366 N.E.2d 1271, 1276-77 (N.Y. 1977). Justice Scalia found this approach "extreme-
and.., unsupportable." Lucas, 505 U.S. at 1016 n.7. Whether the Court's criticism of the
New York Court of Appeals is limited to the particular facts in Penn Central, the ownership
of a number of disconnected and distant parcels in an urban environment, is unclear.
57. 520 U.S. 725 (1997).
58. Id. at 728-29. Ripeness in the takings context is discussed infra notes 150-165 and
accompanying text.
59. Suitum, 520 U.S. at 748 (Scalia, J., concurring) (citation omitted).
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tions will be constitutionally unavailable or because the price of exer-
cising those options will be too high.
The possibility that per se takings might be expanded beyond the
Lucas limits is pushed along by the Court's latest venture into the land
of takings, Eastern Enterprises v. Apfel. 6° Apfel involved neither a local
government nor a land use regulation and so its bearing on Lucas
might be questioned by those who persist in the belief that the Court
will not any time soon move beyond the "all economic value" standard
for per se takings. Apfel was a challenge to the Coal Act, a federal
statute designed to "stabilize plan funding and allow for the provision
of health care benefits to"61 retired coal miners by imposing premi-
ums on all coal companies that were signatories to a previous program
to fund miner health benefits.62 Eastern Enterprises was assessed a
premium of $5 million for a one-year period despite the fact that it
was no longer directly in the coal business; its coal operations were,
since 1966, operated through a subsidiary.63
Apfel raises some intriguing questions, not the least of which is
whether the Takings Clause will now become the vehicle for a new
Lochner era,64 albeit under a different name.65 What is important for
present purposes, however, is one part of the holding of the court of
appeals, the response of Justice O'Connor's plurality opinion to the
court of appeals, andJustice Kennedy's rejoinder to the plurality's tak-
ings analysis.66 The court of appeals rejected Eastern Enterprise's tak-
ings claim, inter alia, because "the Act 'does not involve the total
deprivation of an asset.' 6 7 Justice O'Connor began her response ad-
60. 524 U.S. 498 (1998).
61. Id. at 514 (internal quotation marks omitted) (quoting the Coal Act,
§ 19142(a) (2)).
62. See id.
63. See id. at 516 (noting that "[i]n 1963, Eastern decided to transfer its coal-related
operations to a subsidiary"); id. at 529 (stating that the company owed $50 to $100 million
to the Combined Fund).
64. See Lochner v. New York, 198 U.S. 45 (1905); see also infra note 169.
65. That discussion is beyond the scope of this Article. It will, I suspect, become the
subject of extensive scholarly commentary in the coming years.
66. Justice O'Connor, writing for herself and Justices Scalia and Thomas and Chief
Justice Rehnquist, held that the Coal Act took Eastern Enterprise's property without just
compensation and was thus unconstitutional. Apfe4 524 U.S. at 504. Justice Kennedy was
the fifth vote but he rejected the takings argument, preferring to rest his argument on the
Due Process Clause of the Fifth Amendment. See id. at 547 (Kennedy, J., concurring in the
judgment and dissenting in part). Justice Kennedy's analysis will be discussed in more
depth infra notes 217-230 and accompanying text.
67. Id. at 518 (quoting Eastern Enters. v. Chater, 110 F. 3d 150, 160 (1st Cir. (1997)).
Six years earlier, the Court rejected a similar claim that each dollar taken was a dollar
taken in its entirety and therefore met the Lucas v. South Carolina Coastal Council, 505 U.S.
1003 (1992), test for a regulatory taking. See Concrete Pipe & Prods. of California, Inc. v.
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mitting that the Coal Act was not a "classic taking" but it nevertheless
"permanently deprived [Eastern] of those assets necessary to satisfy its
statutory obligation. ' 68 Then, borrowing a page, without direct cita-
tion, from the exactions cases,6 9 the plurality determined that mone-
tary liability, to survive a takings challenge, must not be "out of
proportion to its experience with the plan."7 ° This reasoning, if ap-
plied to land use controls, would require compensation if any regula-
tion extracts more value from one's land than is justified by the harm
from the proposed use.7 1 For the moment, however, the Court has
decided against applying a "proportionality" or "efficiency" require-
ment on local land use regulations that do not require, either directly
or conditionally, a dedication of land for public use. While unneces-
sary to the ultimate decision in the case, the Court in City of Monterey v.
Del Monte Dunes at Monterey, Ltd.72 unanimously held that "the rough-
proportionality test of Dolan is inapposite to a [regulatory takings]
case." 73 The current state of the doctrine notwithstanding, there is a
Construction Laborers Pension Trust for Southern California, 508 U.S. 602, 643-44 (1993).
The ground for doing so, however, was that the fund itself was indivisible and could not be
segmented for purpose of the Takings Clause. See i& at 644. While citing Concrete Pipe in
support of its decision, the plurality in Apfel ignores the indivisibility language of Concrete
Pipe, relying instead on its conclusion that the liability was out of proportion to its experi-
ence with the plan. See Apfel, 524 U.S. at 530. This might lead one to conclude that Apfel
leaves the door open for a claim that the proportionality requirement might extend to
land use regulations as well. However, the Court's unanimous disavowal in DelMonte Dunes,
infra note 72 and accompanying text, coupled with the plurality's determination in Apfel
that requiring dollars to be spent in order to comply with a particular regulation is not the
constitutional equivalent of those dollars being physically taken.
68. Apfel, 524 U.S. at 523 (internal quotation marks omitted) (quoting Connolly v. Pen-
sion Benefit Guar. Corp., 475 U.S. 211, 222 (1986)).
69. See Dolan v. City of Tigard, 512 U.S. 374, 391 (1994) (stating that "a term such as
rough proportionality' best encapsulates.., the requirement of the Fifth Amendment");
see also Nollan v. California Coastal Comm'n, 483 U.S. 825, 837 (1987) (stating that unless a
"permit condition serves the same governmental purpose as the development ban, [a]
building restriction is not a valid regulation of land use but 'an out-and-out plan of extor-
tion'" (citations omitted)).
70. Apfel 524 U.S. at 528 (internal quotation marks omitted) (quoting Connolly v. Pen-
sion Benefit Guar. Corp., 475 U.S. 211, 226 (1986)).
71. This result would come close to what Richard Epstein has advocated. See EPSTEIN,
TAKINGS, supra note 25, at 100-04 (noting that the use of private property is supported by
the same propositions as taxation and takings). It would also be consistent with the Court's
holdings in other areas. SeeJed Rubenfeld, Affirmative Action, 107 YALE L.J. 427, 428, 437-43
(noting that the Supreme Court has "economized" affirmative action programs by subject-
ing them to cost-benefit balancing).
72. 119 S. Ct. 1624 (1999).
73. Id. at 1635. The Court did not explain why Dolan's rough proportionality was inap-
plicable when the only claim was that a use regulation went too far. The dissent, appar-
ently happy with the majority's concession, simply expressed its agreement. See id. at 1650
(Souter, J., concurring) (joining in Part II of the opinion, the section in which the Court
decided that rough proportionality was inapplicable).
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second and equally serious threat to federalism that is the subject of
the next part.
B. The Process-Based Takings Clause
While several commentators have opined that a process view of
the Takings Clause has yet to influence the takings doctrine, 4 the
evident mistrust, or distrust, of legislative declarations of harm that
underlies the Lucas Court's reliance on common law nuisance assumes
process failures75 similar to those expressed by public choice theorists
and applied to local government land use regulation by Professors Fis-
chel, Ellickson, and others. 76
74. See James E. Krier, Takings From Fruend To Fische4 84 GEO. L.J. 1895, 1909 (1996)
(contending that the "process theory... is not going to win enough subscribers to estab-
lish it as the dominant way of thinking about regulatory takings"); Rubenfeld, Usings, supra
note 14, at 1106 (maintaining that "the interpolation of [the process theory] . . . into
takings law has been a wish consummated far more in the commentary than in the case
law" (footnote omitted)).
75. See Lucas, 505 U.S. at 1014 (stating that "the natural tendency of human nature
[would be] to extend the qualification . . . until at last private property disappear[ed]"
(internal quotation marks omitted) (quoting Pennsylvania Coal Co. v. Mahon, 260 U.S.
393, 415 (1922))). Indeed, Professor Margaret Jane Radin argued that the recent
Supreme Court takings cases reflect a public choice view that legislation that does not
maximize total welfare (i.e. is inefficient) must have an illicit, redistributive motive. MAR-
GARET JANE RADIN, REINTERPRETING PROPERTY 183 (1993).
76. The process approach to takings jurisprudence is supported by two quite independ-
ent analyses. First, and most obviously, is the microeconomic analysis and most particularly
the public choice theory. See JOHN HART ELY, DEMOCRACY AND DISTRUST: A THEORY OF
JUDICIAL REVIEW 97 (1980) (the Takings Clause does not "simply... mark the substantive
value of private property for special protection from the political process .... On the
contrary, the amendment assumes that property will sometimes be taken and provides in-
stead for compensation . . . yet another protection of the few against the many . . .");
FISCHEL, REGULATORY TAKINGS, supra note 8, at 183-217; FISCHEL, ECONOMICS OF ZONING
LAws, supra note 8, at 202 (explaining the rules for takings and entitlement protection in
the context of economics); Robert C. Ellickson, Suburban Growth Controls: An Economic and
Legal Analysis, 86 YALE L.J. 385, 420 (1977) [hereinafter Suburban Growth Controls] (justify-
ing the takings doctrine on the grounds that it can "prevent the costs of a public program
from being arbitrarily imposed" and even "may serve the very different purpose of deter-
ring legislatures from enacting inefficient programs"); Levmore, Just Compensation, supra
note 25, at 308-19 (noting that the takings doctrine is heavily influenced by the extent to
which the burden is isolated and the ability of those burdened to bargain in the political
market); Mandelker & Tarlock, supra note 1 (discussing the political processes of local
governments and their effects on public perception and arguing that local land use deci-
sions deserve heightened scrutiny). But cf DANIEL A. FARBER & PHILIP P. FRICKEY, LAW AND
PUBLIC CHOICE: A CRITICAL INTRODUCTION 72-73, 116-43 (1991) (arguing that courts
should concentrate on legislative processes and structures to ensure against rent seeking
legislation, but also arguing that with regard to the Takings Clause, public choice theory is
more relevant to creating safe harbors from takings claims than defining when a presump-
tion of a takings is appropriate). It is probably unrealistic to assume that this Supreme
Court, with its emphasis on bright line rules, will ever accept in whole Fischel's argument
that deference to local land use regulations should depend upon whether, in the Court's
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judgment, the regulating authority is sufficiently "diverse" so as to assume pluralistic bar-
gaining. On the other hand, the apparent belief that the state's primary policy making
body, the legislature (at whatever level), is prone to rent seeking produces the same, if not
a greater, threat to the state's ability to deal with local problems.
Second, support for a process reading of the Takings Clause comes from a decidedly
noneconomic source, the recent historical analysis of the Takings Clause by Professor Wil-
liam Treanor. See William Michael Treanor, The Original Understanding of the Takings Clause
and the Political Process, 95 COLUM. L. REV. 782 (1995). Professor Treanor marshalled an
impressive array of historical evidence to demonstrate that, with one exception, the con-
cerns that prompted the framers to propose and to ratify the Takings Clause was a fear of
sheer numbers, what today's process scholars denominate as majoritarian bias. See id. at
818-19. Komesar, however, differentiated between majoritarian "influence" and
majoritarian "bias." NEIL K. KOMESAR, IMPERFECT ALTERNATIVES: CHOOSING INSTITUTIONS
IN LAW AND PUBLIC POLICY 76-77 (1994). He argued that whether majoritarian influence
may be described as majoritarian bias may well depend upon one's values and goals:
"[T] hose who value ... equal distribution of wealth may have a different conception of
majoritarian bias than those who value only resource allocation efficiency." Id. at 79. Of
particular concern to James Madison were (1) the abolition of slavery and the freeing of all
slaves by the more populous and nonslaveholding North and (2) the subordination of the
possessory interests of propertied (landed) persons to the nonpropertied interests of the
fast-growing manufacturing and commercial sectors. See Treanor, supra, at 851-55. Only
the fear that the military, in times of emergency, would confiscate both real and personal
property without first seeking political approval was unrelated to majoritarian bias. See id.
at 836 (arguing that "few" saw the military's ability to take property "without providing
redress" as a "critical problem"). Although not necessarily related to majoritarian bias, this
too reflects a "process failure," one having to do with the lack of any accountable political
process. Id. This is analogous to Professor Fischel's concern with state or federal adminis-
trative agencies that act under broad delegations of authority and with respect to isolated
or very few landowners. FISCHEL, REGULATORY TAKINGS, supra note 8, at 330-35 ("Isolating
such areas and uses makes landowners affected by the regulations less able to form political
coalitions with others similarly situated elsewhere in the state in order to mitigate their
burdens."). As a result, land use regulations promulgated by these agencies would be an
exception to Fischel's ordinary rule that large governmental bodies, such as states and the
federal government, ought to be exempt from close judicial scrutiny under the Takings
Clause. From this historical evidence Treanor concludes that "[c]ompensation is due
when a governmental action affects only the property interests of an individual or small
group of people and when, in the absence of compensation, there would be a lack of
horizontal equity." Treanor, supra, at 872. Even if Professor Treanor is correct that
Madison's fears were as he says, and I have no basis for saying otherwise, if Professor
Kramer is correct that Madison's views were not generally persuasive to the constitutional
"framers," there is no basis for a constitutional conclusion that the Takings Clause must be
interpreted in light of a fear of majoritarian bias. See Larry D. Kramer, Madison's Audience,
112 HARtv. L. REv. 611, 671-76 (1999).
A unique perspective, one that has the potential to reorient significantly how we think
about takings, has recently been offered by Professor Saul Levmore, who himself takes a
process view of the Takings Clause. Levmore, Changes, Anticipations, and Reparations, supra
note 48. Using microeconomic analytics, Professor Levmore opined that we ought to en-
courage people to anticipate government's regulatory behavior and, by doing so, take the
needed measures to correct the problems. See id. at 1663. In takings analysis, this would
mean that any regulation which could have reasonably been anticipated would not be com-
pensable (like prohibiting one from building on a beach when to do so is likely to increase
erosion damage?).
THE TAKINGS CLAUSE AND LOCAL LAND USE
Process theory is suspicious of the government's use of power in a
way that reduces the value of a person's property to benefit the larger
community.77 This suspicion is magnified when the size of the regu-
lating community is sufficiently small that minority voices are
drowned out by the din of a cohesive majority.7" The suspicion
reaches its summit when the regulatory subject is land. 9 Land is im-
mobile. Since the owner cannot remove her investment and move it
to a more regulatory friendly jurisdiction, she must either accept the
value reduction or abandon her investment. Once one accepts this
line of argument, federalism, a respect for a local community's au-
thority to cope with the peculiarly local results of land development,
drops from the radar screen.8 ° The focus is no longer the proposed
land use and its impact on the larger community. The only question
is the developer's ability to protect her investment either by influenc-
ing the local governing body or by escaping the jurisdiction with the
investment more or less intact.
The process theorists make three fundamental assumptions
about our political process and those who participate in that process,
First, government is only a mechanism by which individuals can some-
times satisfy their wants more efficiently than by going it alone on the
open market.81 Consequently, cooperation between neighbors will
only occur when necessary to maximize each individual's utility.8 2
Second, those who represent the residents are themselves trying to
maximize their own utilities, which, in this setting, means maximizing
77. See FISCHEL, REGULATORY TAKINGS, supra note 8, at 139 (suggesting that under the
process theory, "judicial review of property regulation is an essential method of coordinat-
ing the intertemporal commitments of local governments," which otherwise "can use regu-
lation in a way that subverts the Constitution's clear commands not to take property
without compensation" and further encouraging "judicial review of local
majoritarianism").
78. See id. at 204 ("The rationale for including the just compensation requirement in
the U.S. and state constitutions was to curb the inclinations of political majorities to im-
pose excessive burdens on politically isolated minorities.").
79. See id. at 139 (noting that "regulation of immobile property by independent local
governments and state agencies, requires most of the attention of judges in regulatory
takings cases").
80. Cf Krier, supra note 74, at 1910 (noting that "[i]t is much easier to complain to the
city council than it is the state legislature, let alone the Congress").
81. See FARBER & FRICKEY, supra note 76, at 44 ("In public choice, government is merely
a mechanism for combining private preferences into a social decision.").
82. See ROBERT M AXELROD, THE EVOLUTION OF COOPERATION 6-7 (1984) (basing coop-
eration theory on the assumption that individuals will pursue their own self-interest and
discussing in what situations self-interested individuals are most likely to come together
and to act collectively).
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their chances for reelection. 83 They are thus unlikely to act as states-
people, dispassionately weighing various land development options
and rationally determining the most appropriate course of action ac-
cording to some notion of a greater community good. Rather, they
are more likely to view themselves as mere agents to implement the
desires of those who elect them. Third, relying on James Madison's
Federalist No. 1 0 , 8 4 the process theorists argue that the smaller and
more homogeneous the government, the more manifest the rent
seeking behavior of both the citizens and their representatives.
85
A number of scholars have questioned whether the assumptions
of the process theorists accurately describes current politics. Profes-
sors Farber and Frickey's research indicates that economic models
that purport to predict legislative behavior fail to consider that legisla-
tors' votes are motivated by more than an interest in re-election.8 6 A
legislator's personal ideology and individual perception of "the public
good" are at least powerful influences.8 7 Indeed, with respect to the
83. SeeJAMES M. BUCHANAN & GORDON TULLOCK, THE CALCULUS OF CONSENT: LOGICAL
FOUNDATIONS OF CONSTITUTIONAL DEMOCRACY app. at 334 (1962). At the risk of gross over-
simplification, public choice theory posits that individuals "buy" political or publicly pro-
duced goods in the same manner and for the same reasons as they buy consumer or
privately produced goods. See id. at 17-19, app. at 334-35. Political goods, like other goods,
are consumed to maximize individual utilities. See id. at 19. More importantly, those who
supply political goods, the elected representatives, respond to the same self-interested in-
centives as suppliers of other goods. The desire to be reelected, however, is not viewed by
Buchanan and Tullock as something to be criticized, as it is by the contemporary press. See
id. at 23-24. It is not based on a desire to "control" the electorate by the elected, but is
rather a recognition that those who choose to serve in an elective capacity have the skills
necessary to maximize the individual utilities of those who elect them. See id. at 19, 23-24.
Not all agree with this rather benign view of what motivates legislators. See, e.g., William H.
Riker & Barry R. Weingast, Constitutional Regulation of Legislative Choice: The Political Conse-
quences ofJudicial Deference to Legislatures, 74 VA. L. REv. 373, 396 (1988) (contending that
legislators merely "build[ ] up an ad hoc majority for the next election" (citations
omitted)).
84. THE FEDERALIST No. 10 (James Madison) (Henry Cabot Lodge ed., 1902).
85. See FISCHEL, REGULATORY TAKINGS, supra note 8, at 105-07 (discussing the Tenth
Federalist and maintaining that "the real problem of faction is not minority interests, but
the majoritarianism rampant in the small republics").
86. See FARBER & FRiCKEY, supra note 76, at 20-33 (arguing that "[s]ome crucial features
of the political world do not fit the economic model" and that public choice does not
account for ideological politicians and popular voting).
87. See FISCHEL, REGULATORY TAKINGS, supra note 8, at 27-33 (describing bills written by
a city solicitor who had developed local support for his personal goals). Others have
reached the same conclusion. A number of studies that noneconomic factors such as altru-
ism "demonstrat[ing] idealogy play at least some role in political participation and deci-
sionmaking" have been noted. See Einer R. Elhauge, Does Interest Group Theory Justify More
Intrusive Judicial Review?, 101 YALE L.J. 31, 43 (citing Farber & Frickey, The Jurisprudence of
Public Choice, 65 TEX. L. REv. 873, 912-14 (1987); Herbert Hovenkamp, Legislation, Well-
Being, and Public Choice, 57 U. CHI. L. REv. 63, 88 & n.56 (1990); Mark Kelman, On Denoc-
racy-Bashing: A Skeptical Look at the Theoretical and "Empirical" Practice of the Public Choice Move-
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Takings Clause, Farber and Frickey conclude not that public choice
theory can provide a rationale for requiring compensation in cases of
perceived majoritarian bias, but rather that it can be helpful in provid-
ing safe havens from takings claims where the beneficiaries of the legis-
lation in question are far more diffuse than those who are burdened
by the regulation.8"
Even discounting Farber and Frickey's work in favor of the a priori
reasoning of the process theorists, the case for any particular interpre-
tation of constitutional text still falls short.8 9 Rather, the link between
assumptions of process failures and a process-based interpretation of
the Takings Clause comes from two closely linked sources, John Hart
Ely's theory that the Constitution should be interpreted so as to rein-
force democratic values9 ° and the third paragraph of footnote four of
United States v. Carolene Products Co." The process defect is a
ment, 74 VA. L. REV. 199, 214-23 (1988); Edward Rubin, Beyond Public Choice, 66 N.Y.U. L.
REV. 1, 2 & n.3, 12-45 (1991)). See also Hovenkamp, supra, at 88 n.56 (citing empirical
studies rejecting the theory that interest groups overcome ideology and voter preferences).
But see JERRY L. MASHAW, GREED, CHAOS, AND GOVERNANCE: USING PUBLIC CHOICE TO IM-
PROVE PUBLIC LAW 38-39 (1997) (questioning the methodology employed by these studies
and suggesting that "[a] bout all that can be said is that models that contain both ideologi-
cal and self-interest factors seem to outperform purely economic models in predicting the
behavior of legislators").
88. See supra note 76. The theory is that if the burden is isolated on a few individuals,
their ability to mount a political opposition is far greater than is that of the diffuse benefi-
ciaries to mount an effective counter campaign. See FARBER & FRICKEY, supra note 76, at 71-
72 ("Public choice suggests that diffuse groups will generally find it difficult to obtain legis-
lation that benefits them at the expense of more compact groups, even where the legisla-
tion creates much greater benefits than costs."); see also Bruce A. Ackerman, Beyond
Carolene Products, 98 HARV. L. REV. 713, 713, 717 (1985) (arguing "that the Carolene
formula cannot withstand close scrutiny" after quoting United States v. Carolene Prods. Co.,
144, 152 n.4 (1938)); MASHAw, supra note 87, at 68 (describing footnote four's perception
of legislative failure as "remarkably underinclusive").
89. For a general, values-based criticism of the use of public choice theory to undergird
constitutional interpretation see Mark Tushnet, Public Choice Constitutionalism and Economic
Rights, in LIBERTY, PROPERTY AND THE FUTURE OF CONSTITUTIONAL DEVELOPMENT 23, at 23
(Ellen Frankel Paul & Howard Dickman eds. 1990) describing public choice theory, in its
constitutional dimension, as "the conservative analogue to [footnote four's] theory of con-
stitutional law." See also MAsIAw, supra note 87, at 51-52 (stating that constitutional theory
cannot be created from public choice theory); Elhauge, supra note 87, at 109 (favoring
decision theory because public choice theory offers a limited view).
90. ELY, supra note 76, at 43, 76, 122-23.
91. 304 U.S. 144, 153 n.4 (1938). The third paragraph of footnote four states:
Nor need we enquire whether similar considerations enter into the review of stat-
utes directed at particular religious, . . . or national, . . .or racial minorities,
whether prejudice against discrete and insular minorities may be a special condi-
tion, which tends seriously to curtail the operation of those political processes
ordinarily to be relied upon to protect minorities, and which may call for a corre-
spondingly more searching judicial inquiry.
MARYLAND LAW REVIEW [VOL. 59:464
majoritarian bias that increases as (1) the size of the regulating entity
and (2) its range of permissible powers decreases.92 The smaller (and
presumably more homogeneous) the community, the greater the pos-
sibility of majoritarian bias.93 And the more focused the community is
on land use, the fewer opportunities there are for dissenting landown-
ers to gain land use compromises by forming coalitions around other
issues. These assumptions prompt William Fischel to conclude that
those who own undeveloped land in small, homeowner dominated
communities should be treated as "discrete and insular minorities" be-
cause, on both the supply and demand side, land is inelastic;95 the
landowner is required to put her land to the prescribed use regardless
of what the land use regulation does to the price. 6 Because of the
inelastic character of land supply and demand, Fischel compares the
regulation of land uses as akin to the regulation of religion by those
who would prefer the individual to conform her religious beliefs to
the norms of the community. 7 The argument, unfortunately, fails to
92. See, e.g., FISCHEL, REGULATORY TAKINGS, supra note 8, at 332 (stating that "local gov-
ernment land use regulations require greater scrutiny [as subject to majoritarian bias] be-
cause the alternative protections of exit and voice are less available").
93. See Krier, supra note 74, at 1902 (discussing the "majoritarian politics of small gov-
ernments" posited under the process theory).
94. See, e.g., FISCHEL, REGULATORY TAKINGS, supra note 8, at 328 (suggesting that "land-
owners should generally fare better in the politics" of large cities, because of the "heteroge-
neity of interest groups" in the cities).
95. See id. at 135 ("Inelasticity of the supply of land is half of the reason that landown-
ers sometimes need the protection of judges in the same way that racial minorities some-
times do.").
96. See id. (explaining that this "inelasticity can come from the insensitivity of either
the quantity supplied or the quantity demanded to changes in rewards and penalties").
97. Id. (suggesting that "inelasticity of the supply of land" is comparable to a near-
immutability of religion since involuntary religious conversion is generally "strenuously re-
sisted" and that landowners may therefore particularly "need the protection of judges").
This accounts for Fischel's limiting his takings theory not only to small homogeneous local
governments but (a) to regulations of land because investments in land are immobile and,
thus, there exists no or limited exit opportunities for the investor, see id., and (b) to regu-
lations of undeveloped land since prohibitions on development are likely to have the most
significant spillover affects on those unrepresented in the local political process. See id. at
251-52. In so limiting his concerns, Professor Fischel relied, as so many others have, on the
seminal work of Albert Hirschman. Professor Hirschman (oversimplified) posited that an
organization's (including a political organization's) competitive position is affected by how
it responds to those who no longer desire to "purchase" what it offers (exit) and the ex-
pressions of dissatisfaction from those individuals (voice). See ALBERT 0. HIRsCHMAN, EXIT,
VOICE, AND LoYALT-. RESPONSES TO DECLINE IN FiRMs, ORGANIZATIONS, AND STATES 21-41
(1970). His book is an exploration of the interplay between these two determining factors.
Despite the attempts at analogy, the reasons for a lack of voice of a landowner caught
by a restrictive local land use regulation, even assuming that is true (compare note 100 and
accompanying text, infra), does not approach that of a member ofJustice Stone's "discrete
and insular minority." Footnote four simply posits a process-based rationale for height-
ened scrutiny for a legislation that is unconstitutional for normative reasons-discrimina-
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distinguish the Takings Clause from any other provision of the Bill of
Rights or any other constitutional provision for that matter. Since all
are controls on majoritarian excesses, the argument would invalidate
any legislation that is even marginally redistributive.9" One would
only need a "comfortable" constitutional provision to do so.
Not only is the extension of Justice Stone's "discrete and insular
minority" characterization inapt to most local zoning disputes in
which it is the developer who is claiming harm, in many instances it
overstates the lack of "voice" of those regulated.99 Certainly resident
landowners, like farmers who desire to sell their land to a developer,
have a voice.100 Their voice may not prevail or even be listened to, but
that is not because of some prejudice or even necessarily a lack of
respect for their position. 01 Rather, their voice may not be heeded
because there is a difference of opinion on something as fundamental
as the community's future and, at least for the moment, only one view
can prevail. Moreover, those who are imposing the regulation are not
tion on the basis of one's racial or ethnic identity. See, e.g., Shaw v. Reno, 509 U.S. 630, 657
(1993) (striking down a legislative reapportionment plan designed to segregate voters into
separate districts on the basis of race); Loving v. Virginia, 388 U.S. 1, 2 (1967) (striking
down a statutory scheme to prevent interracial marriages). Footnote four, for better or
worse, is not a necessary condition for determining that equal protection has been vio-
lated. See Adarand Contractors, Inc. v. Pena, 515 U.S. 200, 236 (1995) (requiring strict
scrutiny to be used in all cases of racial classifications, not just those that burden a disfa-
vored racial minority). There is thus a significant value-based component to footnote four.
Process theory, on the other hand, would make the combination of lack of voice and an
immobile asset sufficient, without more, to demonstrate a takings claim. Apparently no
independent norm is necessary.
98. This is certainly Richard Epstein's position. See EPSTEIN, TAKINGS, supra note 25, at
100-04. Since public choice theory teaches that all legislation is nothing more than private
deal-making under the cloak of public respectability, all legislation would carry a presump-
tion of unconstitutionality. See MAsHAw, supra note 87, at 76-78 (stating that "[iln some
sense, all legislation is special interest legislation"); see also Tushnet, supra note 89, at 38
(attacking "public choice constitutionalism"). Fischel does not go that far. See FISCHEL,
REGULATORY TAKINGS, supra note 8, at 328-29 (suggesting that large cities require less judi-
cial intervention than small locales because they are less subject to a majoritarian bias
found in a small, homogenous population due to the "heterogeneity of interest groups"
found in large municipalities).
99. Cf. Elhauge, supra note 87, at 50 (noting that a "small intensely interested group"
may prevail over "the diffuse ... interest of the majority" in some circumstances).
100. Cf Carol M. Rose, The Ancient Constitution vs. the Federalist Empire: Anti-Federalism
From the Attack on "Monarchism" to Modern Localism, 84 Nw. U.L. REv. 74, 95-96 (1989) [here-
inafter Ancient Constitution] (stating that in local governments, without the "structural re-
straints" of the federal and state governments, there are the "possibilities for constituent
contact and civil participation-.., the 'voice' option" (quoting HIRSCHMAN, supra note
97)).
101. See HIRSCHMAN, supra note 100, at 32 (noting that "on the one hand, the citizen
must express his point of view so that the political elites know and can be responsive to
what he wants, but, on the other, these elites must be allowed to make decisions").
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those who have had a history of isolating and/or persecuting their
neighbor, the farmer. They are friends and neighbors, people with
whom the dissenting landowner has lived and socialized with for
much of her life."' 2 Finally, the smaller the community the greater
the number of opportunities there are for informal political participa-
tion to give voice to dissenting landowners.' Voluntary civic organi-
zations, such as the PTA, the local places of worship, the local VFW,
etc., are all institutions in which voices can be heard and policies in-
fluenced, albeit informally.'" 4 As Professor Rose has noted, "[p]ublic
life at the local level is much more idiosyncratic than national public
life, and much less homogenized."'0 5 These participatory opportuni-
ties, win, lose, or draw, give those with a dissenting viewpoint, at a
minimum, the ability to help frame the parameters of the debate.10 6
Of course, some of those harmed do not have a voice, either formal or
informal in this local community, most obviously nonresident develop-
ers and consumers of whatever those developers hope to produce.
Public action inevitably produces cross-boundary spillovers, some
small and some not so small. But the question, if one is to analogize
to footnote four, is not where those affected reside but who those peo-
ple are.
This is not to deny that restrictive land use regulations may im-
pose what Professor Michelman described as "demoralization
costs."'0 7 These are costs that stem from a number of factors, includ-
ing a sense that the burden the individual is required to bear is dispro-
portionately large compared to other property owners and that those
regulated have little leverage to influence the political system in their
favor in the future.' It is not unlikely that demoralization costs will
be imposed on current residents who have the requisite "voice" to
make their views known, for example a farmer having difficulty mak-
ing ends meet working her small family farm, "stuck" with an unprofit-
able piece of property and no way to dispose of it at anywhere near a
"fair" price. In addition, there is some evidence that these feelings
102. See Rose, Takings, Federalism, Norms, supra note 24, at 1136 (stating that "people at
[local government] meetings may not like what you have to say.., but they know you, and
they know what you stand for").
103. See Rose, Ancient Constitution, supra note 100, at 96-97.
104. See id. at 97.
105. Id. at 97.
106. See Elhauge, supra note 87, at 103-04 ("The minority that loses one vote always has
the possibility of winning the next vote by reframing the issue.").
107. Frank I. Michelman, Property, Utility, and Fairness: Comments on the Ethical Formula-
tions of 'Just Compensation" Law, 80 HARv. L. REv. 1165, 1214-15 (1967).
108. See id. at 1217-18.
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might be more prevalent in small, homogeneous communities be-
cause governments in those communities are likely to have a strong
bias in favor of the status quol°9-to retain undeveloped land in its
existing state. Because land is immobile, exit possibilities are de-
creased and demoralization costs are increased.110 However, even this
reasonable a priori conclusion is subject to some dispute. Professor
Vicki Been has accumulated some impressive support for her argu-
ment that exit possibilities are far greater than process theory would
allow. She has asserted that competition among communities in most
metropolitan areas will prevent the pure rent seeking, majoritarian
land value grabs that the public choice theorists posit."l Developers
can choose from among a number of communities, shopping for the
most favorable zoning."1 2 This ability to choose the location of one's
investment can also act as an effective voice to persuade a local com-
109. Professor Fischel stated that the majoritarian bias in smaller units of government is
in favor of the "median voter" who is a homeowner interested in preserving the value of
her major asset, her home. See FiSCHEL, REGULATORY TAKINGS, supra note 8, at 257-59. Cf
Robert C. Ellickson, Cities and Homeowner's Associations, 130 U. PA. L. REv. 1519, 1561
(1982) (suggesting that applying the one-person/one-vote requirement to local govern-
ments permitted current local residents to maximize their own property values at the ex-
pense of outsiders). There is some empirical evidence to support these conclusions, even
when current property values may well increase as a result of increased development activ-
ity. Elinor Ostrum has demonstrated that in "uncertain and complex environments" peo-
ple weigh possible harms far more than they weigh possible benefits. See ELINOR OSTRUM,
GOVERNING THE COMMONS: THE EVOLUTION OF INSTITUTIONS FOR COLLECTIVE ACTION 207-
10 (1990). Changing the status quo from "within" is thus very difficult when, if Fischel is
correct, most everyone perceives the same harm to the same asset (the home) stemming
from the same proposed activity. See FISCHEL, REGULATORY TAKINGS, supra note 8, at 262.
In addition, Ostrum posited that while small local governing units are likely to en-
courage cooperation among residents, that cooperation is likely to lead to the imposition
of costs on outsiders. See Elinor Ostrum, Institutional Arrangements and the Commons Di-
lemma, in RETHINKING INSTITUTIONAL ANALYSIS AND DEVELOPMENT: ISSUES, ALTERNATIVES
AND CHOICES 107 (Vincent Ostrum et al. eds., 1989) (explaining that "[c]ooperation is not
an unambiguous good in all situations" because cooperation among some participants
"may lead to harms externalized on others"). Professor Fischel agreed, suggesting that the
lack of current adverse impact of the land use regulations on residents and the expectation
that their offspring will live elsewhere provides sufficient incentives for small communities
to export the costs of their land use regulation to outsiders. See FISCHEL, REGULATORY TAK-
INGS, supra note 8, at 131-35 (noting that "dynastic restraints" may not apply when it is
"clear that one's descendants or others one cares about will not in fact be burdened by
promise-breaking" and "most of the costs fall on someone else").
110. Cf Levrnore, supra note 25, at 309 (noting that "[p]roperty owners will be some-
what discouraged from investing in their property to the extent that they fear uncompen-
sated losses").
111. See Vicki Been, "Exit" as a Constraint on Land Use Exactions: Rethinking the Unconstitu-
tional Conditions Doctrine, 91 COLUM. L. REv. 473, 508-43 (1991) [hereinafter "Exit"].
112. See id. at 509 (stating that a "developer dissatisfied with a community's exactions
policy can take the project to another jurisdiction that offers better terms").
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munity of the benefits of more intensive development." 3 Moreover,
even from the perspective of the embattled resident landowner who
may feel trapped and put upon, there is some question about whether
he bears the full cost of the restrictive regulation or whether that cost
is shared with developers and potential residents." 4 To the extent
that it is shared, the choice of those burden sharers can act as an effec-
tive exit opportunity for current residents.
Two conclusions can be drawn from the works of Professors Been
and Rose. First, demoralization costs may not be nearly so significant
as process theory would assume. More importantly, exit and voice are
not necessarily conditions that can be determined ex ante simply from
a priori reasoning. Whether exit is possible and voice exists are empiri-
cal questions.' 15 They will vary from community to community de-
pending on local conditions such as size, political structure, and the
like." 6 They will also vary from region to region depending on the
development regulations of other communities within the same mar-
ket, the extent to which those communities compete with each other
and the nature of that competition. 1 7 Consequently, exit and voice,
if they are to be constitutionally relevant at all, can only be so as ap-
plied, on a case-by-case basis. 1 18
Finally, even if the concern for a lack of exit and/or voice is ap-
propriate in the context of local land use regulation, the process theo-
rists never explain why the Takings Clause is the proper constitutional
remedy. Certainly it cannot simply be that property interests, even
real property interests, are at stake, for property interests are at stake
in many disputes to which the Takings Clause has not been thought to
113. See id. at 477 n.21 ("Developers often have considerable power to effect public pol-
icy ...."); see also Rose, Ancient Constitution, supra note 100, at 97 (maintaining that choice
requires local governments to exercise care in their choice of regulatory policies).
114. See Vicki Been, The Perils of Paradoxes-Comment on William A. Fischel, "Exploring The
Kozinski Paradox: Why is More Efficient Regulation a Taking of Property?," 67 CIU. KENT L. REv.
913, 920-21 (1991) [hereinafter The Perils of Paradoxes] (stating that "most likely ... the
landowner, homebuyer and developer share the costs of exaction").
115. See id. at 920 (contending that the difference between herself and Professor Fischel
on exit opportunities is empirical); see also FARBER & FRICKEY, supra note 76, at 116-17 (criti-
cizing the methodology of public choice theory, reasoning a priori from first principles, as
being inconsistent with the "situational practical reasoning" ordinarily applied to both pri-
vate and public law).
116. Cf Been, "Exit, " supra note 111, at 541-43 (noting that the "incidence of exactions
will depend upon the nature of the supply and demand in the market as well as the struc-
ture of the local building industry" (citations omitted)).
117. Cf id. at 509-11 (maintaining that "[i]f a municipality uses exactions to overregu-
late or overcharge, the developer will take or threaten to take, its capital elsewhere").
118. But see Been, The Perils of Paradoxes, supra note 114, at 921 (suggesting that focusing
on exit and voice permits a "broader determination that on a case by case analysis").
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be applicable. 19 If the problem is that spillover effects are excessive
in the sense that those outside the jurisdiction are suffering the lion's
share of the burdens, the Takings Clause is certainly not necessary to
protect those interests. Such excessive extraterritorial effects will, in
all likelihood, invalidate the zoning under state law as exceeding the
community's statutory or constitutional home rule zoning
authority.
120
Moreover, the Court has given no indication that it is willing to
rethink its holding that neither the Due Process nor the Equal Protec-
tion Clauses of the Fourteenth Amendment invalidate the direct impo-
sition of a local government's laws on those who reside outside a local
government's boundaries and thus on those who have no "voice"
(vote) in that community's political process. 121
Because these persons are (or certainly might be) homeowners,
they have the same exit problems as those who own undeveloped
land. If lack of voice and exit does not raise process concerns suffi-
cient to invalidate regulatory impositions on nonparticipants under
the Equal Protection or Due Process Clauses, it is hard to understand
why lack of voice and exit should mandate a contrary result under the
119. See, e.g., City of Renton v. Playtime Theatre, Inc., 475 U.S. 41, 43, 54-55 (1986)
(holding, as valid, a city ordinance prohibiting "adult motion picture theatres from locat-
ing within 1000 feet of residential zones, single- or multiple-family dwelling, church, park,
or school" and finding that it did not violate the First and Fourteenth Amendments); City
of Cleburne v. Cleburne Living Ctr., Inc., 473 U.S. 432, 435, 442, 447-40 (1985) (holding as
irrational and as violating the Equal Protection Clause (not the Takings Clause) a require-
ment of special use permit for a group home for mentally retarded persons); Moore v. City
of East Cleveland, 431 U.S. 494, 495-96, 503-04 (1977) (invalidating a city housing ordi-
nance definition of "family" as a violation of the Due Process Clause (not the Takings Clause)
of the Fourteenth Amendment); Village of Arlington Heights v. Metropolitan Hous. Dev.
Corp., 429 U.S. 252, 254-55, 270-71 (1977) (finding that a rezoning denial for proposed
racially integrated low- and moderate-income housing was not a violation of the Equal
Protection Clause of the Fourteenth Amendment); Young v. American Mini-Theatres, Inc.,
427 U.S. 50, 52, 58, 72-73 (1976) (holding that a city ordinance prohibiting adult theatres
from locating within 1000 feet of any two other "adult" entertainment establishment, ho-
tels, or within 500 feet of a residential area was not a violation of the Due Process Clause of
the Fourteenth Amendment).
120. See infra notes 253-264 and accompanying text.
121. See Holt Civic Club v. City of Tuscaloosa, 439 U.S. 60, 61-63, 73-75 (1978) (holding
that the Equal Protection Clause of the Fourteenth Amendment did not protect nonresi-
dents of the city of Tuscaloosa, Alabama from the direct regulatory authority of that city
enforced beyond the city's boundaries). WhileJustice Stevens mentioned zoning as one of
the powers that the city did not have, see id. at 77 (Stevens, J., concurring), there is no
indication either in his opinion or that of then Justice Rehnquist, that zoning power alone
would have resulted in a different decision. Cf Melvyn R. Durchslag, Salyer, Ball and Holt:
Reappraising the Right to Vote in Terms of Political "Interest"and Vote Dilution, 33 CAsE W. REs. L.
REv 1, 35-37 (1982) (arguing that the lack of zoning powers should have had no bearing
on outcome of the case).
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Takings Clause. Moreover, as long as arguments about both the em-
pirical basis and normative conclusions of public choice theory con-
tinue to rage, there is little upon which to base an overarching,
process-based theory of the Takings Clause. Indeed, when the basic
assumptions that dictate a preference for judicial, rather than legisla-
tive, decision making are in doubt, the constitutional and prudential
underpinnings of "Our Federalism" demand that deference to legisla-
tive policy judgements, even those of small, limited jurisdiction local
governments, be the rule.1 22
II. LocAL LAND USE REGULATION AND FEDERALISM
A. Federalism Values
This is hardly the place for a long essay on federalism. The polit-
ical science and legal literature on federalism would likely fill several
libraries.12 Most generally, federalism is a political concept judi-
cially enforced or not) 124 whereby governmental power is allocated
between the national government and the states.' 25 Not surprisingly,
most of the explicit federalism controversies and much of the federal-
ism literature is directed to conflicts between federal and state legisla-
tive authorities. 126 That aspect of federalism is not my immediate
122. Cf Henry N. Butler &Jonathan R. Macey, Externalities and the Matching Principle; The
Case For Reallocating Environmental Regulatory Authority, 14 YALE L. & POL'v REv. 23, 66
(1996) (arguing that state and local governments are the more appropriate regulating
agencies where the harms caused by the regulated activity are not external to that agency's
political boundaries).
123. Cf Larry Kramer, Understanding Federalism, 47 VAND. L. Rev. 1485, 1485 (1994)
[hereinafter Understanding Federalism] (noting that the subject has so many dimensions that
even it could "occupy most of an academic career").
124. Compare Garcia v. San Antonio Metro. Transit Auth., 469 U.S. 528, 550 (1985) (5-4
decision) ("[T]he principal means chosen by the Framers to ensure the role of the States
in the federal system lies in the structure of the Federal Government."), with New York v.
United States, 505 U.S. 144, 146 (1992) (declaring invalid a congressional statute that
forced states to either make arrangements for disposal of low-level nuclear waste generated
within their borders or to take title to that waste) and United States v. Lopez, 514 U.S. 549,
578 (1995) (Kennedy, J., concurring) ("[T]he absence of structural mechanisms to require
[federal] officials to undertake [to protect state interests], and the momentary political
convenience ... attendant upon their failure to do so, argue against a complete renuncia-
tion of the judicial role.").
125. See Garcia, 469 U.S. at 549-52 ("The power of the Federal Government is a 'power
to be respected' . . . , and the fact that the States remain sovereign as to all powers not
vested in Congress or denied them by the Constitution offers no guidance about where the
frontier between state and federal power lies.").
126. See New York v. United States, 505 U.S. at 149 ("The constitutional question is as old
as the Constitution: It consists of discerning the proper division of authority between the
Federal Government and the States."). Part of the reason is historical. The allocation of
legislative authority between the states and the newly formed federal government was fore-
most in the minds of the Framers. Until recently, however, lawyers arguing about federal-
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concern however.1 27 Rather, I will focus on a different federalism is-
sue-whether the Court should account for local land use policy judg-
ments in determining how broadly to interpret the Takings Clause.
In one sense, these two distinct aspects of federalism are quite
congruent. Whether state or local policy making is displaced by Con-
gress by reason of the Supremacy Clause 128 or because the Court, act-
ing pursuant to the Fourteenth Amendment,1 29 has determined .that
the state's means of land use regulation is excessive, the effect on the
generally agreed upon values underlying our federal structure is more
or less the same. 3 ' The state's ability to "experiment"1 3 with a variety
ism values did so only hypothetically. Between 1941, when the Court decided in United
States v. Darby, 312 U.S. 100 (1941), that Congress could regulate the wages of employees,
whether actually engaged in the production of goods destined for interstate commerce or
not, and 1992, when the Court struck down Congress's attempts to regulate interstate ship-
ments of low-level nuclear waste by imposing certain obligations on the states in New York v.
United States, 505 U.S. 144 (1992),judicial oversight of federal/state legislative prerogatives
was all but absent. Since 1992, and particularly since 1995, the Court has reasserted itself
as an umpire of the federal system. See City of Boerne v. Flores, 521 U.S. 507, 535-36
(1997) ("Broad as the power of Congress is under the Enforcement Clause of the Four-
teenth Amendment, RFRA contradicts vital principles necessary to maintain . . . the federal
balance." (emphasis added)); Seminole Tribe v. Florida, 517 U.S. 44, 47, 78 (1996) (finding
that Congress has no power under the Commerce Clause to waive states' Eleventh Amend-
ment immunity); United States v. Lopez, 514 U.S. 549, 551-52, 567 (1995) (holding that
the Gun-Free School Zones Act of 1990 exceeds Congress's Commerce Clause powers).
127. Certainly, legislative federalism issues may arise with respect to local land use issues.
One of the principal arguments of the plaintiffs in Hodel v. Virginia Surface Mining & Recla-
mation Ass'n, Inc., 452 U.S. 264 (1981), was that the federal statute requiring reclamation of
land used for strip mining encroached on state land use regulation prerogatives, a "tradi-
tional" local function. See id. at 274. Moreover, federal legislation has been proposed that
would, inter alia, have required states to compensate landowners for regulatory land value
reduction. See Property Rights Implementation Act of 1998, S 2271, 105th Cong. (this par-
ticular legislation was killed by a Senate filibuster). See generally Glenn P. Sugameli, "Tak-
ings" Bills Threaten People, Property, Zoning, and the Environment, 31 URB. LAw. 177 (1999)
(cataloguing and describing recent congressional efforts to limit local zoning). If such
legislation were to be enacted, challengers would not only argue the separation of powers
claim that Congress had exceeded its powers under § 5 of the Fourteenth Amendment by
interpreting § I of the Fourteenth Amendment more broadly than did the Court, but, in
light of Boerne's evident concern for preserving state prerogatives, 521 U.S. at 507, 536,
would argue infringement on state legislative prerogatives as well.
128. U.S. CONST. art. VI, § 2.
129. U.S. CONST. amend. XIV, § 1.
130. Most commentators identify at least three underlying values of federalism, protect-
ing states and ultimately the people themselves from the tyranny of a large centralized
authority (the federal government), encouraging citizen participation at the level of gov-
ernment where it is most possible, the local level, and allowing experimentation, and thus
diversity, in how best to deal with social and economic problems. See, e.g., Erwin Chemerin-
sky, The Values of Federalism, 47 FLA. L. REv. 499, 525 (1995). Professors Adler and Kreimer
have added a fourth, recognition that geographic diversity demands different governmen-
tal responses in different regions of the country. See Matthew D. Adler & Seith F. Kreimer,
The New Etiquette of Federalism: New York, Printz, and Yeskey, 1998 Sup. CT. REV. 71, 77-78.
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of land use regulatory policies is severely limited whether in the name
of an overriding federal legislative agenda or in the name of individ-
ual rights."l 2 In the same vein, one can hardly imagine a greater disin-
centive to political engagement at the local level, the government
most conducive to republican values of participation, than severely cir-
cumscribing its major policy making role, controlling its physical and
environmental amenities.133
Even the other commonly cited value of federalism, preserving a
structural mechanism for protecting individual liberties, if not contra-
dicted by the Court's current takings jurisprudence, is at least compro-
mised by partially federalizing state property rights determinations.
First, by necessity, Lucas severely restricts what Professor A.E. Dick
Howard called "a dialectic about the allocation of power. ' 134 In the
takings setting, this "dialectic" or dialogue centers around the level of
government that most appropriately should determine when and to
what extent one's property rights must be compromised to protect
local community values. Lucas does nothing to encourage this dia-
logue. More significantly, Lucas disengages the state's major policy
arm, the legislature, from the process of experimenting with a variety
of land use control devises to conserve an increasingly scarce re-
source."3 5 The Court instead prefers the principles of common law as
the outer benchmark of the state's regulatory prerogatives. As Profes-
sor Michelman has argued, Lucas either implicitly adopts a federal
131. New State Ice Co. v. Liebmann, 285 U.S. 262, 311 (1932) (Brandeis, J., dissenting)
(stating that states "serve as ... labrator[ies]; [to] try novel social and economic experi-
ments without risk to the rest of the country"). Professor Deborah Merritt was correct
when she argued that despite the quote's clich6 value, it has particularized applicability,
certainly when considering the degree of latitude federal courts should give local zoning
authorities. Deborah Jones Merritt, Three Faces of Federalism: Finding a Formula for the Future,
47 VAND. L. REv. 1563, 1575 (1994); see infra notes 133-135 and accompanying text.
132. Cf Lucas v. South Carolina Coastal Council, 505 U.S. 1003, 1030 (1992) (relegating
the state legislature to a secondary role, and noting that the "'takings' jurisprudence ...
has traditionally been guided by the understandings of our citizens regarding the content
of, and the State's power over, the 'bundle of rights' that acquire when they obtain title to
property").
133. See A.E. Dick Howard, Does Federalism Secure or Undermine Rights ?, in FEDERALISM AND
RIGHTS 11-20 (Ellis Katz & G. Allan Tarr eds., 1996) ("Of all the values implicit in federal-
ism, none is more fundamental to self-government by a free people than is the right of
choice."); see also id. at 13-16 (listing and elaborating on other similar values including "the
educational value of civic participation," maintaining a "sense of community," and provid-
ing "local solutions to local problems"). I read these latter three values as subsets of the
larger value of local self-determination.
134. Id. at 18-19.
135. Cf Rose, Takings, Federalism, Norms, supra note 24, at 1148 (noting that "takings
jurisprudence has to take into account communities' need to deal with shrinking common
resources").
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common law of property or constitutionalizes William Blackstone's
natural law property rights. 136 Either way the Court does serious dam-
age to principles of federalism. If Lucas has formulated generally ap-
plicable principles of federal property law, that would be inconsistent
with the judicial federalism of Erie Railroad Co. v. Tompkins.'3 7 On the
other hand, if the Court was merely setting the constitutional floor on
the protection of property rights, as it does with respect to liberty or
equality rights:
[O]nce again it seems deeply at odds with Our Federalism.
For its consequence is to federalize the law of land use in a
peculiarly profound way. The effect is to make the Federal
Constitution, specifically the Taking Clause, dictate to the
States the jurisprudential spirit in which their general laws of
property and nuisance are to be read and construed,
whether contained in legislative enactments or judicial
decisions.13
This leads to the third concern, centralization. Lucas raises many
of the same federalism objections that troubled the Court in United
States v. Lopez. 3' First, Lucas has the effect of preempting state legisla-
tive authority with respect to the kinds of harms that may appropri-
ately be considered when deciding whether to limit how a landowner
uses her property.14 ° Arguably, the Court did the same thing in Roe v.
136. See Michelman, Property, Federalism, and Jurisprudence, supra note 37, at 318-27 (main-
taining that Lucas may be an attack on Erie and a support of a "federal constitutional law" or
that Lucas finds that the "Fourteenth Amendment mandates a minimum natural-law con-
tent"). Blackstone's bundle of property rights is described in Robert C. Ellickson, Property
in Land, 102 YALE L.J. 1315, 1362-63 (1993). Professor Rubenfeld certainly believes that
Lucas 'Lochernizes' federal takings jurisprudence. Rubenfeld, Usings, supra note 14, at
1099-1100 (stating that "the close of the Lochner era... marked the end of Supreme Court
takings decisions resting foursquare on the harm principle," but also stating that the Court
has "kept the principle alive" in Lucas).
137. 304 U.S. 64, 65 (1938) ("There is no such thing as a federal common law.... ."); see
supra note 136.
138. Michelman, Property, Federalism, and Jurisprudence, supra note 37, at 327. The pas-
sage quoted above is the last step of Professor Michelman's very careful and structured
analysis of the federalism implications of the Court's opinion in Lucas. Between his expres-
sions of concern about Lucas's natural law approach to defining the minimum bundle of
property rights and the quoted passage lies Michelman's critique (destruction?) of argu-
ments founded on natural rights ("nature") and "American constitutional culture." Id. at
321-24 (internal quotation marks omitted).
139. 514 U.S. 549 (1995).
140. See Michelman, Property, Federalism, and Jurisprudence, supra note 37, at 311-14 (ex-
plaining that a " [ s] tate's regulatory restriction of land use can be a taking of property in
the constitutional sense, and it is (generally speaking) a taking when it deprives an owner
of a land parcel of all economically beneficial use of the parcel," notwithstanding a "very




Wade1 4 ' and City of Richmond v. J A. Croson Co. 142 The difference, how-
ever, is that notions of liberty and racial equality are determined with-
out regard to "current legal facts."' 43 Property, on the other hand,
owes both its existence and its contours to positive law, local positive
law.1 4 4 Property simply does not exist in the absence of state law. 145
Second, Lucas preempts that authority in an area that is ordinarily
regarded as one of largely local concern.' 46 Finally, by effectively re-
quiring the states to consider (at the least) a more formalist or rule-
based approach to their property laws, Lucas co-opts the state's legisla-
tive and judicial processes in much the same way that the dissent in
Federal Energy Regulatoy Commission v. Mississippi 47 claimed that the
Public Utilities Regulatory Policies Act of 1978 co-opted the state's ad-
ministrative/legislative agenda.'48
The point is not to repeat what Professor Michelman has already
observed, that there is an inconsistency between how the Court has
approached "Our Federalism" in Lucas and how it has approached
"the Other Guy's (Congress's) Federalism" in Lope7z. 149 Rather, the
point is to raise a separate question-whether the individual rights
context of Takings Clause litigation necessarily means that the Court
should ignore federalism concerns, particularly in those areas, such as
land use regulation, that are widely regarded as being of local con-
cern. In the following part, I argue that not only should the Court
account for federalism values in all but the most extreme cases, but its
failure to do so is inconsistent with its analysis in other land use regu-
141. 410 U.S. 113 (1973). Justice White, who dissented in both Roe v. Wade and Doe v.
Bolton, expressed the federalism impact as follows: "[T] he legislators of the 50 States are
constitutionally disentitled to weigh the relative importance of the continued existence
and development of the fetus ... against a spectrum of possible impacts on the matter."
Doe v. Bolton, 410 U.S. 179, 222 (1973) (White, J., dissenting).
142. 488 U.S. 469 (1989). By limiting a city's remedial efforts to correcting identified
past discrimination and imposing strict standards of proof regarding demonstrating past
illegal discrimination, the Court severely limited state and local authority to correct the
problem of a segregated labor and capital market in the construction industry.
143. Michelman, Property, Federalism, and Jurisprdence, supra note 37, at 304 (emphasis
added); see alsoJames F. Blumstein, Federalism and Civil Rights: Complementary and Competing
Paradigms, 47 VAND. L. REV. 1251, 1252 (1994) ("The traditional civil rights paradigm pro-
tects individual liberties by resort to universalistic principles .... ").
144. See Michelman, Property, Federalism, and Jurisprudence, supra note 37, at 305 (stating
that "property cannot stand while the laws fall").
145. See id.
146. See supra note 140 and accompanying text.
147. 456 U.S. 742 (1982).
148. See id. at 772-73 (Powell, J., dissenting) (arguing that the Public Utilities Regulatory
Policies Act of 1978 "forces federal procedures on state regulatory institutions").
149. Michelman, Property, Federalism, and Jurisprudence, supra note 37, at 302, 311-15 (cit-
ing Younger v. Harris, 401 U.S. 37, 44 (1971)).
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lation cases, even when so-called fundamental rights are claimed to
have been violated.
B. Balancing Individual Rights and Federalism Values
1. Two Preliminary Observations.-Before proceeding to analyze
the question posed above, there are two preliminary matters that de-
serve mention. First, the Court quite regularly accounts for federalism
values in takings challenges to local land use regulations. In Agins v.
City of Tiburon15° the Court held that a landowner's claim for inverse
condemnation was not ripe for adjudication unless the landowner has
submitted a development plan to the local authorities and that devel-
opment plan was rejected. 1 Five years later, in Williamson County Re-
gional Planning Commission v. Hamilton Bank,152 the Court extended
the submission requirement of Agins. 53 The developer submitted a
development plan and, indeed, spent over $3 million dollars on site
improvements, including a golf course for the development.15 4 The
county then amended the zoning ordinance to reduce the density of
the proposed housing. 55 Based on that amendment, the planning
commission rejected the development proposal, and the developer in-
itiated an inverse condemnation suit. 56 Again, the Court found that
the action was not ripe because, under state law, the developer could
have filed for a variance but failed to do so. 5 7 Finally, one year later,
in MacDonald, Sommer & Frates v. County of Yolo,158 the Court again
held that an inverse condemnation claim was not ripe because it read
the two state court opinions as providing a possibility that the county
would permit some form of development on the property, even
though it had unconditionally rejected the development plan submit-
ted by the plaintiffs. 59
150. 447 U.S. 255 (1980).
151. Id. at 260 ("Because the appellants have not submitted a plan for development of
their property .... there is yet no concrete controversy regarding the application of the
specific zoning provisions." (citing Socialist Labor Party v. Gilligan, 406 U.S. 583, 588
(1972); Goldwater v. Carter, 444 U.S. 996, 997 (1979) (Powell, J., concurring))).
152. 473 U.S. 172 (1985).
153. Id. at 186-97 (finding that a takings claim is not ripe until a final decision has been
made by the responsible government concerning the application of the ordinance and the
regulations to the property and all state procedures providing for obtaining compensation
have been utilized).
154. See id. at 178.
155. See id.
156. See id. at 181-82.
157. See id. at 188.
158. 477 U.S. 340 (1986).
159. See id. at 351-52.
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Ripeness as applied by the Court in these cases, however, reflects,
at best, a respect for state processes. If there is an analogy to be
drawn, these cases are more analogous to the abstention requirement
of Younger v. Harris1 61 than to Lopez s respect for state policy choices in
areas of significant local impact.161 My argument is founded on the
latter. Moreover, after Lucas, one has to at least wonder how strictly
the Court will adhere to its previous ripeness decisions. The ripeness
issue came up in Lucas because after the inverse condemnation action
was heard in the state supreme court but before its decision, South
Carolina amended the Beachfront Management Act to permit special
use permits to construct dwellings otherwise prohibited by the Act.162
The Court held that ripeness was not an issue because Lucas had a
temporary takings claim for the period between the effective date of
the Beachfront Management Act (1988) and the enactment of the
special permit proceeding in 1990.163 Because of the amendment's
timing, that part of the ruling in itself does not question the previous
ripeness cases. But, as Justice Blackmun argued in his dissent, Lucas
never submitted a development plan nor did he challenge the stat-
ute's baseline or set back requirement as he was permitted to do even
under the unamended version of the Act. 164 The majority's response
was simply (and in a footnote) that such action would have been
fruitless. 1
65
160. 401 U.S. 37 (1971). In Younger, the Court refused to enjoin a criminal prosecution
under the California Criminal Syndicalism Act where it is possible for the defendant to
assert his federal constitutional claims in that state court proceeding. See id. at 41. The
same year, Younger was held applicable to actions seeking federal declaratory relief because
of the resjudicata effect of a federaljudgment on the state criminal proceeding. See Samu-
els v. Mackell, 401 U.S. 66, 68-69 (1971). Younger was subsequently extended to state civil
proceedings where important state interests are at stake. See Middelsex County Ethics
Comm. v. Garden State Bar Ass'n, 457 U.S. 423, 429, 431-32 (1982). More pertinent to
land use regulation, Younger was held to apply to state administrative proceedings. See
Ohio Civil Rights Comm'n v. Dayton Christian Schs., Inc., 477 U.S. 619, 622, 626-29
(1986). Younger abstention also applies to federal judicial intervention in an on-going state
eminent domain proceeding. See Hawaii Hous. Auth. v. Midkiff, 467 U.S. 229, 238 (1984).
161. See United States v. Lopez, 514 U.S. 549, 567-68 (1995) (refusing to "obliterate the
distinction" between what is truly national and what is truly local (internal quotation marks
omitted) (quoting A.L.A. Schechter Poultry Corp. v. United States, 295 U.S. 550, 554 (Car-
dozo, J., concurring))); see also id. at 581 (Kennedy, J., concurring) (outlining the reach of
the commerce power and advocating that the court "must inquire whether the exercise of
national power seeks to intrude upon an area of traditional state concern").
162. See Lucas v. South Carolina Coastal Council, 505 U.S. 1003, 1010-11 (1992).
163. See id. at 1012-14 ("In these circumstances, we think it would not accord with sound
process to insist that Lucas pursue the late-created 'special permit' procedure before his
takings claim can be considered ripe.").
164. Id. at 1042-43 (Blackmun, J., dissenting).
165. See Lucas, 505 U.S. at 1012 n.3 ("[S]uch a submission would have been pointless, as
the Council stipulated ... no building permit would have been issued under the 1988 Act,
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The second preliminary matter has been dealt with above 66 but
it bears repeating briefly. My argument is not that local policy reasons
can justify a total "wipe-out"'6" of all economic value from one's land.
To make that argument one would not only have to reject excessive
regulation as a basis for a takings claim, (something worth considering
but hardly on the near horizon '68 ) but would probably have to attack
the very notion of the "commodification" of property, a concept that
goes back at least to Lord Coke.' 69 I am neither the person, nor is this
the place to make those arguments. I accept the Lucas Court's hold-
ing that only community harm of the most significant variety, like a
public or private nuisance, can justify a total loss of value. 7 ' I worry,
application or no application." (citation omitted)). It is that summary dismissal of the
applicability of Hamilton Bank that leads me to wonder about how strictly it and Yolo County
will be applied in the future. I will not, however, pursue that line of argument any further
in this paper because, as noted above, my concern is with the integrity of the substance of
local land use decisions, not with whether an inverse condemnation plaintiff has exhausted
all her state administrative remedies. For an excellent discussion of ripeness in takings
cases see Gregory M. Stein, Regulatory Takings and Ripeness in the Federal Courts, 48 VAND. L,
REv. 1 (1995).
166. See infra notes 230-231 and accompanying text.
167. The phrase "wipe-out" is taken from WINDFALLS FOR WIPEOUTS: LAND VALUE CAP-
TURE AND COMPENSATION 5 (Donald G. Hagman & DeanJ. Misczynski eds. 1978) (defining
"wipeout" as "any decrease in the value of real estate other than one caused by the owner
or by general deflation").
168. For a well-supported argument that the Court's current regulatory takings jurispru-
dence is not only lacking in textual support and "Framer's intent," but is denied by local
land use regulations adopted during the colonial period and in effect at the time of the
"framing," see John F. Hart, Colonial Land Use Law and Its Significance for Modern Takings
Doctrine, 109 HARV. L. REv. 1252, 1289-93 (1996).
169. See Lucas, 505 U.S. at 1017; see also supra note 45. Compare Ellickson, supra note 136,
at 1375-80 (exploring the benefits of viewing land as an instrument of commerce, as well as
some of the arguments against), with RADIN, supra note 75, at 11-43, 53-55, 80-84 (discuss-
ing the distinction between "personal" and "fungible" property rights). Professor Radin's
argument is not that property should not be "commodified," but rather that only that
property that is intimately tied to one's individual identity, one's personhood, and ulti-
mately to one's freedom should be compensable under the Takings Clause. See id. at 53.
Property that a developer holds merely for resale or speculation, the true commodity, and
what Professor Radin described as "fungible" property, should not be compensable under
the Takings Clause. See id. at 12; see also Gregory S. Alexander, Dilemmas of Group Autonomy:
Residential Associations and Community, 75 CORNELL L. REv. 1, 9-11, n.40 (1989) (discussing
"the personality theory of property" and noting that certain residential arrangements may
give "people an instant feeling of identity").
170. See Lucas, 505 U.S. at 1029-30. But see Just v. Marinette County, 201 N.W.2d 761,
772 (Wis. 1972) (upholding a local regulation prohibiting use of wetland property for
purposes other than "natural purposes" to stop the despoliation of natural resources).
Like Justice Kennedy, however, I am not persuaded that state and local legislative bodies
are institutionally incapable of making judgments about how much harm necessitates an
absolute prohibition on "valuable" (read market rewarding) uses of land. See Lucas, 505
U.S. at 1035 (Kennedy, J., concurring) (arguing that the "state should not be prevented
from exacting new regulatory initiatives in response to changing conditions"); see also Key-
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however, that the Court's recent decisions17 coupled with several cir-
cuit court opinions t72 will not limit the per se rule of Lucas to those
cases in which the owner has been deprived of all economic value of
his land. As I argue below, when a land use regulation does not im-
pose that extreme a burden, the Court should give state and local
governments a fairly wide berth when determining whether a land-
owner should be compensated for the developmental effect of land
use regulations. 173 What this means, as a practical matter, is that the
stone Bituminous Coal Ass'n v. DeBenedictis, 480 U.S. 470, 475 (1987) (5-4 decision) (ana-
lyzing a case in which the legislature determined that certain mining practices constituted
a threat to the general welfare); Miller v. Schoene, 276 U.S. 272, 279 (1928) (examining a
case in which the legislature determined that the state's economic interest in apple pro-
duction justified removal of all disease-producing red cedar trees). Moreover, the notion
that a regulation can be "unconstitutional," requiring the government to pay damages in
the form of compensation, not because the legislature intended to extract from a land-
owner all of the value she has in a piece of property for redistribution to the community at
large, but because the private market attaches no monetary value to the use permitted, is
troubling. It effectively holds government's policy choices hostage to the whims of the
private market. Cf Lochner v. New York, 198 U.S. 45, 64 (1905) (holding effectively that
government policy regarding wage and hour legislation is governed by the common law of
contracts). If, because of the availability of camping facilities near the shoreline in South
Carolina (or for numerous other reasons), appraisers determine that private persons are
not willing to pay for the permanent right to pitch a tent on Lucas's land, any regulation
that effectively limits the property to that use is a taking, irrespective of a range of policy
reasons that might otherwise provide a solid basis for the regulation. See Lucas, 505 U.S. at
1037-39 (Blackmun, J., dissenting) (outlining the reasons for South Carolina's Beachfront
Management Act). On the other hand, as long as land is viewed, constitutionally, largely as
a market commodity, albeit a unique market commodity, that result is probably inevitable.
171. See supra notes 57-63 and accompanying text.
172. See Florida Rock Indus., Inc., v. United States, 18 F.3d 1560, 1562-63 (Fed. Cir.
1994) (appellees seeking compensable takings for denial of Clean Water Act permit to
mine for limestone under 98 acres of the 1560 acres of wetland owned by them); Lovela-
dies Harbor, Inc., v. United States, 28 F.3d 1171, 1174 (Fed. Cir. 1994) (appellees seeking
compensable takings for denial of permit to backfill 11.5 acres of a 250 acre parcel of
wetlands owned by them). These cases, in effect, held that a landowner could subdivide
his track into several parcels and recover compensation for each parcel on which develop-
ment was unreasonably restricted.
173. This is essentially Justice Powell's reasoning in what is possibly the paradigm mod-
ern case in which the Court accounted for state sovereignty interests in defining the scope
of individual rights. See San Antonio Indep. Sch. Dist. v. Rodriguez, 411 U.S. 1 (1973).
Justice Powell distinguished the plaintiffs equal protection claim of sub-par educational
expenditures in the San Antonio school district from the case in which there had been "an
absolute deprivation of the desired benefit." Id. at 23-24. Before that point has been
reached, the majority's concern for preserving state policy choices about how it funds its
public services trumps the harm that those choices inflict on individuals. See id. at 58 ("The
consideration and initiation of fundamental reforms with respect to state taxation and edu-
cation are matters reserved for the legislative processes of various States .... "). Cf Plyler v.
Doe, 457 U.S. 202, 230 (1982) (striking down a Texas statute that absolutely denied illegal
aliens the right to free public education in the Texas school system).
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reasons for the land use restriction need only pass rational basis
scrutiny.
2. Accounting for Federalism Values-The Experience Outside Tak-
ings.-Does the individual liberties focus of Takings Clause litigation
so change the inquiry that the federalism concerns expressed in Lopez
become inconsequential in a case like Lucas? The public choice an-
swer is undoubtedly a resounding yes. State policy making has more
to fear from Congress than it does from the federal judiciary. At least
that much is implicit in the Lopez Court's rejection of structural pro-
tections as the sole insurer against federal overreaching. Momentary
passions and the desire of legislators to do what must be done to curry
favor with the voters1 74 contrasts sharply with the lifetime appointed
federal judiciary.1 75 The assumption is not without merit. There is
growing experience to support the notion that Congress has shown
little regard for federalism principles, particularly when dealing with
high profile, "hot-button" political issues that are ready made for dem-
agoguery and/or "credit grabbing. ' 176 If anything, just the opposite is
true of the federal judiciary; the Court at times has placed an inappro-
174. See supra note 83 and accompanying text.
175. See U.S. CONST. art. III, § 1. Professor Epstein has argued that even state judges,
many of whom are elected, are less subject to rent seeking behavior than are elected repre-
sentatives. Richard A. Epstein, The Independence ofJudges: The Uses and Limitations of Public
Choice Theory, 1990 B.Y.U. L. REV. 827, 831, 835 n.32.
176. See William Marshall, American Political Culture and the Failures of Process Federalism, 22
HAR. J.L. & PUB. POL'Y 139, 145 (1998) (recognizing that politicians may weigh the polit-
ical rewards of getting on "the bandwagon of popular legislation" against the "political
damage" of opposing it). To Professor Marshall's list might be added the rush for addi-
tional federal gun control legislation in the aftermath of the Littleton, Colorado school
shooting. But seeJESSE H. CHOPPER, JUDICIAL REVIEW AND THE NATIONAL POLITICAL PROCESS:
A FUNCTIONAL RECONSIDERATION OF THE ROLE OF THE SUPREME COURT 184-88 (1980) ("As
illustrated by the prolonged constitutional debates in Congress that delayed passage of the
Sherman Act for several years and stalled desperately needed antilynching laws and civil
rights legislation .... Congress has generally paid fastidious attention to the notion that
certain government powers are reserved to the states." (footnote omitted)). Cf Larry D.
Kramer, But When Exactly Was Judicially-Enforced Federalism "Born" in the First Place?, 22 HARV.
J.L. & PUB. POL'V 123, 133-34 (1998) (arguing that there is little history to support the view
that judicially-enforced federalism was ever actively engaged in by the federal judiciary).
This is a line of argument that I will not pursue or try to resolve here. Suffice it to say that
my own view is that whatever one may say about the theoretical justifications for the
Court's attempts to keep Congress in line in the name of protecting federalism values, it
will probably end in failure as it did prior to Wickard and Darby. See Melvyn R. Durchslag,
Will the Real Alphonso Lopez Please Stand Up: A Reply to Professor Nagel, 46 CASE W. REs. L.
REv. 671, 679-83 (1996) ("To paraphrase Justice White, the Court undoubtedly has the
'raw judicial power' to review whether there exists a sufficiently substantial relationship
between an activity and our national economic welfare to justify federal regulation. But
the wisdom of undertaking that review is quite something else." (quoting Doe v. Bolton,
410 U.S. 179, 222 (1973) (White, J., dissenting))). For a more complete analysis of the
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priately heavy thumb on federalism values at the sacrifice of individual
liberties. 177 Moreover, because state and particularly local legislative
bodies pose even greater threats to "minority" (dissenting) property
interests 178 than Congress, there is even greater reason for judicial in-
tervention than in Lopez despite the centralizing effect of that inter-
vention. Lucas is thus arguably a breath of fresh air.
One need not adhere to that "dark" view of legislative processes
(or a "bright" view of judicial processes) to conclude that the Court
plays a far different role in protecting individuals from state action
than it does in insulating states' lawmaking institutions from federal
preemption. A simple formalistic argument would combine the tex-
tual protection of property rights in the Fourteenth Amendment, 179
the Supremacy Clause," 8 and the (maybe too) often repeated state-
ment from Marbury v. Madison 8 ' that it is "emphatically the province
and duty of the judicial department to say what the law is" '182 to re-
quire that the Court protect property rights as vigorously as it protects
other personal liberties. The final step in the argument is the propo-
sal that by protecting individuals from the actions of their own states,
the Fourteenth Amendment effectively removed federalism concerns
institutional difficulties with judicially-enforced federalism limits on Congress see Kramer,
Understanding Federalism, supra note 123, at 1494-1503.
177. Durchslag, Federalism and Constitutional Liberties, supra note 42, at 731-34 (stating
that when the Supreme Court "derogate[s] principles of individual liberty" to the further-
ance of federalism, it appears to be a "betrayal of its perceived mission" as a "forum of last
resort for the protection of individual liberties").
178. This is certainly the basis of Professor Fischel's thesis regarding the Takings Clause
as well as that of Professors Mandelker and Tarlock. See supra note 95. And while certainly
less "process oriented," Professor Epstein would not disagree that given the choice of pro-
tecting the lifestyle desires of the many or protecting the "property rights" of the stalwart
individual, the legislature, any legislature, will opt for the former. See EPSTEIN, TAKINGS,
supra note 25, at 263-66, 281-82.
179. The importance of property to the maintenance of our personal liberties has been
the subject of extensive commentary. See EPSTEIN, TAKINGS, supra note 25, at 13-14 (noting
Locke's emphasis on the "critical role of private property in the overall scheme of govern-
ance"); JENNIFER NEDELSKY, PRIVATE PROPERTY AND THE LIMITS OF AMERICAN CONSTITUTION-
ALISM: THE MADISONIAN FRAMEWORK AND ITS LEGACY 240-46 (1990) (discussing the
implications of a redefining of property that will "usher in a new era of greater equality");
BERNARD H. SIEGAN, ECONOMIC LIBERTIES AND THE CONSTITUTION 30-31 (1980) (arguing
that the failure of the Framers to expressly prohibit against confiscation of property by the
government "does not prove that the Framers were unconcerned about this liberty"); Mark
Tushnet, Federalism and the Traditions of American Political Theory, 19 GA. L. REv. 981, 985-93
(1985) (discussing the role that property plays in the liberal and republican tradition).
180. U.S. CONST. art. VI, § 2.
181. 5 U.S. (1 Cranch) 137 (1803).
182. Id. at 177.
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from the individual rights balancing equation. 8 3 The latter conclu-
sion, however, significantly overstates the truth both historically and
currently. In the balance of this subsection, I will demonstrate that
the Court considers values of local control of local matters when de-
ciding how broadly to read protections afforded by the Bill of Rights.
Historically, the Court's first opportunity to interpret the Four-
teenth Amendment, the Slaughter-House Cases, 8 4 gutted the Four-
teenth Amendment's privileges or immunities clause simply because
the Court did not want to disrupt the federal/state balance. 8 5 That
caution is intermittently observed today under both the equal protec-
tion and the due process clauses of the Fourteenth Amendment." 6
Take for example the "Incorporation" cases. While it is true that with
the exception of the Seventh Amendment right to a jury trial in civil
183. See Michael W. McConnell, Federalism: Evaluating the Founder's Design, 54 U. CHI. L.
REv. 1484, 1501 (1987) (noting that the "premise of the Fourteenth Amendment" was that
the federal government, not, as the original design would have it, the states, would be the
primary insurer of individual liberties); Jean Yarbrough, Federalism and Rights in the Ameri-
can Founding, in FEDERALISM AND RIGHTS 70 (Ellis Katz & G. Allan Tarr eds., 1996) ("It is
now clear that the abandonment of federalism resulted.., from an enthusiasm for using
the powers of the national government to protect rights and liberties."); see also Kramer,
Understanding Federalism, supra note 123, at 1494-96 ("[T]he key to a viable federalism is
said to be the guarantee of judicially-enforced substantive limits on national authority.").
But see Earl M. Maltz, Federalism and the Fourteenth Amendment: A Comment on Democracy and
Distrust, 42 OHIo ST. L.J. 209, 216 (1981) (arguing that substantive rights and concepts of
equality must be understood in terms of our constitutional structure that establishes dual
sovereigns).
184. 83 U.S. (16 Wall.) 36 (1872).
185. See id. at 74-75, 82 (stating that the Court did not see any reason to "destroy the
main features of the general system"). But cf. Saenz v. Roe, 119 S. Ct. 1518, 1525-26 (1999)
(holding that the right to travel and to remain temporarily in a state is protected by the
Privileges and Immunities Clause of Article IV, and the right of newly arrived residents to
be treated like any other citizen of the state is protected by the Privileges and Immunities
Clause of the Fourteenth Amendment).
186. See Durchslag, Federalism and Constitutional Liberties, supra note 42, at 735, 761 (not-
ing that the Supreme Court has "consistently recognized federalism concerns in interpret-
ing civil rights laws" as well as it being an "important consideration in determining the
requirements of [the Fourteenth Amendment's] due process."); see also Melvyn R. Durch-
slag, Welfare Litigation, the Eleventh Amendment and State Sovereignty: Some Reflections on Dan-
dridge v. Williams, 26 CASE W. RES. L. REV. 60, 78 (1975) (discussing the noninterventionist
policy of the Supreme Court in Maryland's treatment of welfare recipients in Dandridge v.
Williams, 397 U.S. 471 (1970)); Michael J. Gerhardt, The Monell Legacy: Balancing Federal-
ism Concerns and Municipal Accountability Under Section 1983, 62 S. CAL. L. REv. 539, 613
(1989) (discussing the Supreme Court's policy in Monell v. Department of Social Services, 436
U.S. 658 (1978), that struck a balance between the accountability of municipalities in fed-
eral court for their constitutional violations and the degree to which they are subject to
federal court supervision); Louise Weinberg, The New Judicial Federalism, 29 STAN. L. REv.
1191, 1193-94 (1977) (stating that "a new judicial federalism seems to be emerging, requir-
ing deferences to state administration and state adjudication that only yesterday were
thought unnecessary or unwise").
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cases exceeding twenty dollars, all of the other first eight amendments
on which the Court has ruled have been applied to the states through
the Due Process Clause of the Fourteenth Amendment.' 87 It is also
true that when states are held to the restraints of one of the first eight
amendments, those restraints are identical to those imposed on the
federal government.'88 There is thus no accommodation made in the
name of preserving some degree of state autonomy. But the process for
determining whether a right is sufficiently fundamental to justify ap-
plying it to the states is conscious of the states and their interests. In
determining whether the right to ajury trial in noncapital felony cases
was "fundamental," and thus binding on the states, the Court in
Duncan v. Louisiana'89 noted that "[i]n every State . . . the structure
and style of the criminal process ... naturally complement jury trial,
and have developed in connection with and in reliance upon the jury
trial."19 The Court, in other words, looked to a consensus of the
states in determining the scope of federal "procedural" rights.
Consideration of state views and interests is not limited, however,
to the incorporation of procedural rights. There are a number of ex-
amples in which federalism has played a crucial role in narrowing the
187. The Court has not ruled on whether or not the Second Amendment's right to bear
arms and the Third Amendment's prohibition on quartering troops in private residences
are sufficiently "fundamental" to be incorporated. A number of commentators have ar-
gued the likelihood of the Second Amendment being incorporated and made applicable
to the states by the Due Process Clause of the Fourteenth Amendment. See, e.g., Steven H.
Gunn, A Lauyer's Guide to the Second Amendment, 1998 B.Y.U. L. REv. 35, 46 (addressing the
unlikelihood of the Supreme Court finding an individual right to bear arms in the Second
Amendment and applying it to the states by incorporation through the Fourteenth
Amendment); Don B. Kates, Jr., Handgun Prohibition and the Original Meaning of the Second
Amendment, 82 MICH. L. REv. 204, 253 (1983) (noting the absurdity of excluding the Sec-
ond Amendment from incorporation against the states as it contradicts the "entire doctri-
nal basis" of the current incorporation of the Bill of Rights against the states); Sanford
Levinson, The Embarrassing Second Amendment, 99 YALE L.J. 637, 653 (1989) (questioning the
justification for treating the incorporation of the Second Amendment against the states
differently from the incorporation of the First, Fourth, Fifth, Sixth, and Eighth Amend-
ments); Nelson Lund, The Second Amendment, Political Liberty, and the Right to Self-Preservation,
39 ALA. L. REv. 103, 110 (1987) (arguing the inconsistency of excluding the Second
Amendment from incorporation against the states in light of the doctrine of incorporation
that "is so unquestioningly applied to other provisions of the Bill of Rights"). One United
States district court has held that the Third Amendment was applicable to the states. See
Engblom v. Carey, 522 F. Supp. 57, 67-68 (S.D.N.Y. 1981) (finding no violation of the
Third Amendment by the state), rev'd on other grounds, 677 F.2d 957 (2d Cir. 1982).
188. See Malloy v. Hogan, 378 U.S. 1, 8 (1964) (applying the Fifth Amendment); Boiling
v. Sharpe, 347 U.S. 497, 500 (1954) (prohibiting the Federal Government from maintain-
ing racially segregated schools under the Due Process Clause of the Fifth Amendment).
But see Crist v. Bretz, 437 U.S. 28, 52-53 (1978) (Powell, J., dissenting) (arguing that no
fundamental constitutional rights were at issue).
189. 391 U.S. 145 (1968).
190. Id. at 150 n.14.
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substantive scope of federal constitutional liberties 9' but, because of
its remarkable contrast with Lucas, perhaps the best example is Paul v.
Davis,'92 in which the Court held that an individual had no constitu-
tionally protected interest in his reputation.193 The "reasoning" in
Paul is revealing for what it says about how the Court circumscribed
state property law in Lucas. Then Justice Rehnquist, writing for the
majority, began his federalism analysis with a remarkable statement.
Quoting from Screws v. United States,'94 which in turn took its cue from
the Slaughter-House majority, Rehnquist observed that the Fourteenth
Amendment did not significantly alter the federal system.' 95 He then
proceeded more specifically to two related threats that accepting the
plaintiffs claim would pose to federalism values.196 First, Justice
Rehnquist argued that to accept the plaintiffs assertion of a constitu-
tionally protected right in reputation would effectively impose a "body
of general federal tort law."' 97 Second, he expressed a reservation
that the federal judiciary was institutionally incapable of administering
such a body of law because of its inability to tailor the law to the di-
verse problems encountered in each state.19 8 Professor Michelman's
analysis places Lucas squarely within the Court's judicial federalism in
191. See, e.g., DeShaney v. Winnebago County Dep't of Soc. Serv., 489 U.S. 189, 203
(1989) ("The people of Wisconsin may well prefer a system of liability which would place
upon the State . . . the responsibility for failure to act .... But they should not have it
thrust upon them by this Court's expansion of the Due Process Clause of the Fourteenth
Amendment."); City of Los Angeles v. Lyons, 461 U.S. 95, 112 (1983) (finding that "a
proper balance between state and federal authority counsels restraint in the issuance of
injunctions against state officers engaged in the administration of the States' criminal
law"); San Antonio Indep. Sch. Dist. v. Rodriguez, 411 U.S. 1, 44-53 (1973) (upholding the
Texas school financing system against a constitutional challenge under the Equal Protec-
tion Clause of the Fourteenth Amendment). Cf Miller v. California, 413 U.S. 15, 30-37
(1973) (adopting a local standards test for determining obscenity under the First and Four-
teenth Amendments); Davis v. Monroe County Bd. of Educ., 119 S. Ct. 1661, 1678 (1999)
(Kennedy, J., dissenting) (arguing that federalism concerns over a federal presence in state
school systems demand a close look at whether Congress clearly authorized private suits
against local school districts under tide IX of the Civil Rights Act).
192. 424 U.S. 693 (1976).
193. See id. at 702 (finding "no constitutional doctrine converting every defamation by a
public official into a deprivation of liberty within the meaning of the Due Process Clause of
the Fifth or Fourteenth Amendment" (footnote omitted)).
194. 325 U.S. 91 (1945).
195. See Pau4 424 U.S. at 700 (quoting Screws, 325 U.S. at 108-09).
196. See id. at 700-01.
197. Id. at 701 (citing Griffen v. Breckenridge, 403 U.S. 88, 101-02 (1971)).
198. See id. This is not the only example of how federalism values have been used by the
Court in determining the scope of substantive constitutional liberties or the remedial
power of the federal judiciary. See supra note 191; see also DeShaney v. Winnebago County
Dep't of Soc. Serv., 489 U.S. 189, 195-97 (1989) (holding that generally the Due Process
Clause does not create an alternative duty on the state to protect the individual against
private actors).
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Paul.199 Moreover, on the few occasions when the Court has reviewed
local land use decisions when takings has not been the issue, it has
substantially deferred to local legislative judgments notwithstanding
the assertion of other, nonproperty-related individual liberties.2 ° °
These cases are distinguishable from Lucas in one fundamental
way; they all involve attempts to extend individual rights beyond what
the Court had previously accepted and certainly beyond those enu-
merated in the text.20 1 Justice Powell's response in Rodriguez was sim-
ple: "It is not the province of this Court to create substantive
constitutional rights in the name of guaranteeing equal protection of
the laws."'202 Rather, the question is "whether there is a right ... ex-
plicitly or implicitly guaranteed by the Constitution."20 3 Because
property is protected by the text of the Fourteenth Amendment, the
argument would run, it is no more appropriate to limit basic property
rights in the name of federalism than it would have been to limit a
black student's right to attend an integrated school because education
is a traditional local concern and thus should be substantially con-
trolled by the state.20 4 That argument, however, does not answer two
land use cases in which a textual right, the right of free speech, was
199. Michelman, Property, Federalism, and Jurisprudence, supra note 37, at 309-10 (sug-
gesting that under the Takings Clause, "no constitutionally significant taking of property
can occur unless some government in some way perpetuates a departure from some then-
existent body of law," and "it is a commonplace of Our Federalism that [matters of prop-
erty law] are left for definition by bodies of state law" (emphasis omitted)). Cf Paul, 424
U.S. at 710 (noting that the liberty and property interests protected by the Due Process
Clause "attain this constitutional status by virtue of the fact that they have been initially
recognized and protected by state law" (footnote omitted)).
200. See Village of Arlington Heights v. Metropolitan Hous. Dev. Corp., 429 U.S. 252,
270 (1977) (finding that single family zoning that effectively prohibited low-income hous-
ing apartments in the area was not racially discriminatory); Village of Belle Terre v. Boraas,
416 U.S. 1, 8-9 (1974) (upholding the exclusion of households consisting of more than two
nonrelated residents from a single family residential zone against due process and equal
protection challenges).
201. The exception is Arlington Heights, which ruled on whether racial discrimination
could be demonstrated only by the exclusionary effect of the zoning ordinance. 429 U.S.
at 270; see also Washington v. Davis, 426 U.S. 229, 248-52 (1976) (deferring to the legisla-
ture and declining to extend the more lenient test of title VII cases to a verbal aptitude
test).
202. San Antonio Indep. Sch. Dist. v. Rodriguez, 411 U.S. 1, 33 (1973).
203. Id. at 33-34; see also Vacco v. Quill, 521 U.S. 793, 807 (1997) (refusing to extend the
Cruzan right to "assisted suicide"); Cruzan v. Director, Missouri Dep't of Health, 497 U.S.
261, 286-87 (1990) (refusing to extend the right to refuse treatment beyond "the patient
herself"); Bowers v. Hardwick, 478 U.S. 186, 190-91 (1986) (refusing to extend the Gris-
wold/Roe right beyond "family, marriage, or procreation").
204. See, e.g., Brown v. Board of Educ., 347 U.S. 483, 493 (1954) (noting that "education
is perhaps the most important function of state and local governments" and holding that
"segregation of children in public schools solely on the basis of race ... deprive[s] the
children of the minority group of equal educational opportunities").
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seemingly modified or at least curiously applied out of apparent defer-
ence to state "environmental" concerns, Young v. American Mini-Thea-
tres, Inc.205 and City of Renton v. Playtime Theatre, Inc.2°8 Both cases
involved attempts by cities, Detroit in the former case and (obviously)
Renton, Washington in the latter, to eliminate locally undesirable
land uses (LULU's) from areas in which residential or related uses
were common. 20 7 In both cases, the LULU was defined (in part in
Young and wholly in Renton) in terms of the content of the speech sold
or produced by the prohibited uses.2"8 Finally, in both cases, the
Court upheld the regulation, despite its content specificity, on the
ground that the city was not directing its regulation to limiting what it
considered offensive speech but was instead attempting to prevent
neighborhood deterioration. 9
Admittedly it is a stretch to read Young as a federalism case. Jus-
tice Powell's concurring (and controlling) opinion uses the findings
of the Detroit Common Council more to establish the lack of a spe-
cific intent to prohibit showing certain materials because of their con-
tent than to establish a general principle of deference to local land
210use determinations. The same, however, cannot be said of Renton.
The Renton ordinance did not limit a wide range of LULU's as did
the Detroit ordinance.2 ' Nor, unlike Detroit, was there any evidence
of city council hearings that indicated any threat to Renton from
"adult" entertainment facilities. Consequently, there was no evidence
whatsoever that the Renton ordinance was in fact directed at so-called
secondary effects rather than at the content of the speech itself.2 12
Indeed, common sense would suggest that the city of Renton was sim-
205. 427 U.S. 50 (1976).
206. 475 U.S. 41 (1986).
207. Both cases dealt with adult movie theatres. See Renton, 475 U.S. at 43; Young, 427
U.S. at 44.
208. See Renton, 475 U.S. at 43; Young, 427 U.S. at 44.
209. See Renton, 475 U.S. at 54-55 (finding as legitimate a city's interest in preserving the
quality of life for its citizens); Young, 427 U.S. at 71-73 (finding as legitimate a city's interest
in preserving the present and future character of its neighbors).
210. Young, 427 U.S. at 74-75 (Powell, J., concurring) (stating that "the Council was mo-
tivated by its perception that the 'regulated uses' ... worked a 'deleterious effect upon the
adjacent areas' and could 'contribute to the blighting and downgrading of the surround-
ing neighborhood'" (quoting Young, 427 U.S. at 54 & n.6)).
211. Renton, 427 U.S. at 57 (Brennan, J., dissenting) (noting that only adult movie thea-
ters are prohibited, and not "other forms of 'adult entertainment"'). The Renton City
Council explained its intention in adopting the ordinance as "promoting the City of Ren-
ton's great interest in protecting and preserving the quality of its neighborhoods, commer-
cial districts, and the quality of urban life through effective land use planning." Id. at 58-
59.
212. See id. at 57 (stating that the "selective treatment" of adult movie theaters "strongly
suggests that Renton was interested not in controlling the 'secondary effects' associated
2000]
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ply trying to keep certain "pornographic" material beyond its borders.
The Court determined, however, that Renton cared only about its
neighborhoods and not about the availability of the proscribed
speech.21 And "a city's 'interest in attempting to preserve the quality
of urban life... must be accorded high respect."2 4 The Court thus
applied rational basis scrutiny, both to the determination of the na-
ture of the ordinance (key to determining whether the ordinance is
content-specific or content-neutral) and to whether the local commu-
nity reached the appropriate balance between the harm the speech
imposed on the "quality of urban life" and the restrictive impact the
ordinance had on the quantity of admittedly protected speech enter-
ing the "marketplace." '215 Both Justices Blackmun and Stevens, in
their own way, argued in Lucas for the same deference to local legisla-
tive declarations about the threat posed by the proposed land use to
the broader community interests. 216 Lucas is thus not only difficult to
square with the Court's professed concerns for federalism expressed
in cases like Lopez, but it is also at odds with its use of federalism in
individual rights cases in general and in land use regulation cases
specifically.
3. The Problem of Mobility. -Federalism is a two-way street.
Although it is most often used, as I have been guilty of doing here, to
put a weightier thumb on state authority at the expense of federal
impositions, it also protects individuals from overreaching at the local
with adult business, but in discriminating against adult theaters based on the content of
the films they exhibit").
213. See Renton, 427 U.S. at 48 (stating that "the city's pursuit of its zoning interests here
was unrelated to the suppression of free expression"). Apparently, as long as the ordi-
nance looks like a zoning ordinance it will be treated as a zoning ordinance. See also
Barnes v. Glen Theatre, Inc., 501 U.S. 560, 582 (1991) (Souter, J., concurring) (finding
that a general statute prohibiting nudity in a public place was constitutionally applied to
adult entertainment facilities on the grounds that the statute regulated "secondary
effects").
214. Renton, 475 U.S. at 50 (quoting Young, 427 U.S. at 71) (citing id. at 80 (Powell, J.,
concurring)).
215. See id. at 54-55 (finding that Renton did not employ "'the power to zone as a pre-
text for suppressing expression,' ... but rather has sought to make some areas available for
adult theaters and their patrons, while at the same time preserving the quality of life in the
community at large by preventing those theaters from locating in other areas" (internal
citation omitted) (quoting Young, 427 U.S. at 84 (Powell, J., concurring))).
216. See Lucas v. South Carolina Coastal Council, 505 U.S. 1026, 1045-51 (1992) (Black-
mun,J., dissenting) (arguing for the traditional rule requiring plaintiffs to produce some
evidence to contradict the legislature's findings); id. at 1068-71 (Stevens, J., dissenting)
("The Court's holding today effectively freezes the State's common law, denying the legisla-
ture much of its traditional power to revise the law governing the rights and uses of
property.").
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level.217 Most often this requires "federalization" of basic individual
liberties, a concept at odds with the original design of the Constitu-
tion.218 The "need" to federalize rights, however, is not necessarily
inevitable. It only becomes inevitable when government (at whatever
level) is exercising monopoly regulatory power, thus providing no out
for those regulated. The key to federalism is therefore mobility.
219
And, as the phrase goes, "therein lies the rub" with judicial deference
to local land use policies. Land is immobile. As a result, there is no
exit from regulations that substantially impinge on the use value of
land. Because the landowner cannot pick up her marbles (so to
speak) and go home, she has no choice but to accede to the commu-
nity land use choices. This is the essence of Professor Fischel's argu-
ment that the land use policies of small homogeneous local
governments should be viewed with skepticism by the Court 220 as well
as Professor Epstein's broader argument that nonnuisance-based land
use regulations are takings.221
217. See Akhil Reed Amar, Five Views of Federalism: "Converse-1983" in Context, 47 VAND. L.
REV. 1229, 123940 (1994) (citing THE FEDERALIST No. 51 (James Madison) and suggesting
that federalism assures compliance with specific individual rights); Kramer, Understanding
Federalism, supra note 123, at 1502 (illustrating the need for broader federal authority and
helping states to protect themselves); Richard B. Stewart, Federalism and Rights, 19 GA. L.
REV. 917, 918 (1985) (contending that federalism prevents local oppression of minorities).
218. See Blumstein, supra note 143, at 1259 (arguing that the traditional paradigm pro-
tects individual liberties by resorting to universalistic principles); Richard A. Epstein, Exit
Rights Under Federalism, 147 LAw & CONTEMP. PROBS. 147, 150 (1992) [hereinafter Exit
Rights] ("The insight that federalism offered the prospects of structural limitations against
the abuse of state power against its own citizens was not ... part of the original constitu-
tional plan, but instead ranks only as a necessary and happy byproduct of that design.").
219. See Stewart, supra note 217, at 923 (arguing that personal mobility has been a key
element in monitoring the individual-local-federal balance). Cf ROBERT H. BORK, THE
TEMPTING OF AMERICA: THE POLITICAL SEDUCTION OF THE LAw 53 (1990) (suggesting that
federalism is the only neutral principle for protecting individual rights because it maxi-
mizes individual choice regarding regulatory regimes); McConnell, supra note 183, at 1493
(illustrating that decentralized authority, by promoting free choice, also maximizes aggre-
gate societal welfare).
220. See FISCHEL, REGULATORY TAKINGS, supra note 8, at 271, 285 (noting that citizens
cannot "withdraw immobile assets from jurisdictions whose laws threaten to devalue those
assets" and "[1]ocal land use regulations are an unusually effective means of transferring
wealth from a distinct minority to a political majority and should thus be subject to special
scrutiny under the Takings Clause"). One could quibble that Fischel's concern is not so
much that land is immobile, thus making exit impossible, but that landowners have no
voice in the chambers that promulgate land use regulations. That is the basis for his dis-
tinction between small homogeneous communities where pluralistic bargaining is absent
and larger more diverse communities where political bargaining can blunt the potential
for significant land use regulatory exactions. I accept that. On the other hand, it is the
lack of exit opportunities that allows the lack of voice to manifest itself in "confiscatory"
regulation.
221. See EPSTEIN, TAKINGS, supra note 25, at 216-19 (concluding that when the state pro-
hibits full exploitation of resources, prohibiting individual maximization of wealth for the
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This argument is difficult to counter. In Village of Belle Terre v.
Boraas,2 22 the Court upheld a zoning ordinance that prohibited unre-
lated individuals from occupying homes in areas zoned for single fam-
ily dwellings.223 In terms of options, the property owner could have
rented his home to married college students from Stoney Brook,
could have lived in it himself, or could have, like all other residents of
the village, sold it as a single family residence. 2 4 The same could be
said of the land use regulation in Renton, since profitable commercial
uses other than adult entertainment were permitted. Moreover, in
both Renton and Belle Terre, the regulatory impact was not so much on
the use of the land itself, but on the nature of commercial activity that
could be conducted on the land. 225 The effect was thus more on how
commercial capital was invested than on the land qua land.2 2 6 Finally,
even Rodriguez, perhaps the case in which the Court's accounting for
federalism values in the rights balancing equation was least defensible,
can be rationalized on a form of exit theory. While it is tempting to
view Rodriguez as a case in which poor people, because of their poverty,
were trapped in school districts that under state law were incapable of
increasing educational spending even if they wanted to,2 27 in fact the
Court found that there was little correlation between the wealth of the
individual and the taxable wealth of the school district.2 8 Without
that correlation, it is difficult to argue, certainly a priori, that exit op-
portunities to school districts that had a greater ability to increase ed-
ucational funding did not exist.229
common good, property owners should be compensated); Epstein, Exit Rights, supra note
218, at 155-57 (arguing that local decisions will often reflect the view of the electorate and
not of the society at large).
222. 416 U.S. 1 (1974).
223. Id. at 8-9.
224. Professor Radin has a different "spin" on Belle Terre. She argued that the small
community of Belle Terre was articulating its residents' "personhood," which outweighed
either the personhood of the S.U.N.Y. students or the property owner who was merely
selling living space to the highest bidder. RADIN, supra note 75, at 70, n.151.
225. See supra notes 207-215, 222-224 and accompanying text.
226. See supra notes 207-215, 222-224 and accompanying text.
227. See San Antonio Indep. Sch. Dist. v. Rodriguez, 411 U.S. 1, 67 (1973) (White, J..
dissenting) (noting that a state imposed limit on a local school district's tax rate disabled
property poor districts from raising local funds to equal that raised by property wealthy
districts).
228. See id. at 23 (stating that "there is no basis on the record.., for assuming that the
poorest people-defined by reference to any level of absolute impecunity-are concen-
trated in the poorest districts").
229. The Court has certainly not been consistent with limiting deference to state poli-
cies to those instances in which one can make a plausible argument that those whose rights
have been compromised can assert them in other locations. For example, in Planned
Parenthood of Southeastern Pennsylvania v. Casey, 505 U.S. 833 (1992), the Court determined
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Of course, as noted above, if Professor Been is correct that the
ability of a burdened landowner to escape to a more investment-
friendly jurisdiction is far greater than the economists would allow,
the lack of mobility is no impediment to deference to local land use
restrictions.2 ' 0 But one need not accept Professor Been's conclusions
to reach the same judgment. As I have noted, for purposes of the
thesis of this Article, I accept the proposition that a regulation that
deprives a landowner of all economic value of contiguously developable
property cannot be justified in terms of some overriding principle of
local autonomy.2 1 I reach a different conclusion, however, when a
local land use regulation only reduces the value of a particular parcel.
As long as value remains, the regulation does not deny the possibilities
of mobility, it merely imposes a cost on exit. That is insufficient to
deny deference to local land use judgments. To do so would be in-
consistent with deference to local land use decisions exhibited by the
Court in other cases and would impose upon the Court an inquiry
that it is incapable of conducting.
Let me illustrate with a somewhat overly detailed "hypotheti-
cal."23 2 Assume a small township consisting of 20,000 acres of land
(more or less), approximately sixty-five percent of which is being ac-
tively farmed. Only about fifteen percent of the land is residential.
The balance is devoted to infrastructure, commercial and industrial
uses (about two percent), parks, and institutional (mostly governmen-
tal) uses. The township is bisected by two divided, four-lane state
highways, one north/south and the other east/west. That in itself has
not been sufficient to promote large scale development in the town-
ship, in part because of the distance to the county's major city, but
more importantly, because there is no easy access to water and to sew-
age treatment, although estimates are that over the past several years
about 500 acres of township land has been converted from agricul-
tural to residential uses. Current residential zoning requires a two
acre minimum lot.
Change, however, may be in the offing. A small incorporated vil-
lage adjacent to the township has recently drilled two new water wells,
that Pennsylvania's 24 hour waiting period was not an "undue burden" on a woman's right
to exercise her right to terminate her pregnancy despite evidence that it would impose
severe burdens on women with the least financial resources. Id. at 885-87. Consequently,
these women could not "escape" the burdens of the regulation.
230. See supra notes 111-115 and accompanying text.
231. See supra note 52 and accompanying text.
232. What follows is based on an actual township in northern Ohio. Even the numbers,




bringing the total capacity to nearly one million gallons per day. Resi-
dents of the village consume only about 160,000 gallons per day, creat-
ing a substantial excess of capacity. In addition, the village has a
sewage treatment plant, and there are plans to upgrade and to in-
crease the capacity of that plant. At a recent village council meeting,
it was proposed (although not acted upon) that the village sell its ex-
cess water and sewage treatment capacity outside of its borders. This
action would significantly increase the value of the township's land for
development despite its distance to a major population center.
A owns Blackacre, a 200-acre farm that has been in the family for
a number of generations. It is still a profitable farm, but there are
increasing difficulties ahead. A's only son has expressed doubts about
his desire to continue in the family business, and the market for agri-
cultural products may soon require some shift in the farm's output to
remain profitable. D is a developer who, since the village's discussion
of selling excess water and sewage treatment capacity beyond its bor-
ders, has been eyeing A's farm. Given the community's two acre zon-
ing, D figures that she can build between seventy-five and eighty new
homes on the property. That would increase the township's popula-
tion by more than one-third. Recognizing that the current two acre
zoning is no longer sufficient to prevent turning the township into
just another urban-type suburb, the town has considered a number of
land-use options, including increasing the minimum lot size to either
five or seven acres, maintaining the two acre minimum lot size but
requiring dedication by developers for open space, and setting aside a
substantial portion of the community's land for agricultural uses. Fi-
nally, we can assume that any one of these changes will reduce the
market value of A's farm by something approaching fifty percent. 233
Professor Epstein would undoubtedly consider these zoning
changes to be a taking. Even the current two acre zoning would con-
stitute a taking. 234 As I read Professor Fischel, he too would consider
the proposed zoning changes to be a taking. He would consider the
233. The hypothetical concentrates on A, the farmer, rather than on D, the developer,
to avoid the criticism leveled by Professor Epstein that Professor Been's work says nothing
about the exit rights of nondeveloper landowners whose property is ripe for purchase. See
Epstein, Exit Rights, supra note 218, at 155 n.17 (criticizing Been for not taking into ac-
count the "fundamental difference in the position" of the landowner and of the devel-
oper). But see Been, Exit, supra note 111, at 501-04, 511 (contending that the exit right will
protect the developer).
234. See EPSTEIN, TAKNGS, supra note 25, at 102-04 (arguing that focus should not be on
the size of the economic value but rather on the loss of a property right); Epstein, Exit
Rights, supra note 218, at 155-56 (discussing the effects on the landowner who does not
share the exit right of developers).
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proposals to be pure rent seeking because existing residents are at-
tempting to preserve what they value most, their rural environment,
by appropriating the property values of nonconsenting residents
(political minorities) and those with no voice, the developer (presum-
ably a nonresident) and future residents, by adopting zoning regula-
tions that vary from the community's norm.23 5 Neither conclusion,
however, sufficiently recognizes the benefits that derive from decen-
tralized decisionmaking. 2 6 Epstein accounted for it not at all and Fis-
chel, because of his fundamental distrust of land use legislation
enacted by the likes of our hypothetical township, would apparently
lock it into an existing zoning plan enacted well before the threat of
urbanization appeared on the radar screen.23 7
Failing to account for federalism values might be correct if we
can assume that A and all other A's in the world in fact have no exit
possibilities. A does however; it will just cost money. How much can
be fairly calculated as the present value of his land for residential de-
velopment under the existing two acre zoning reduced by the present
value of his farm as currently operated. The question is whether the
imposition of a cost, any cost, on mobility to a friendlier territory
means that judicial recognition of local autonomy is out of bounds.
The norm, it would appear, is otherwise. By limiting the amount of
land available for adult entertainment facilities, the City of Renton
increased the cost of Playtime Theatre's exercising its First Amend-
ment rights. 23 8 Presumably, when the Village of Belle Terre restricted
the rental market (the demand) by removing unrelated individuals
(and therefore much of the college community at the adjoining state
university), it reduced the market value of Boraas's property.23 9 In-
deed, the regulation in Belle Terre was enacted for the very same rea-
sons that our hypothetical township wants to change its zoning-to
preserve the "character" of the town.24 ° Finally, even Professor Ep-
stein conceded that some regulatory reductions in the market value
235. See FISCHEL, REGULATORY TAKINGS, supra note 8, at 351-53 (stating that anything
above the community's norm should be compensable); see also Ellickson, Suburban Growth
Controls, supra note 76, at 422-23 (arguing that the community norm should be the measur-
ing standard).
236. See supra notes 233-235 and accompanying text.
237. See supra notes 233-235 and accompanying text.
238. The Court's response to the theater's argument about the regulation's significantly
increasing costs was that the First Amendment did not guarantee sites at "bargain prices."
City of Renton v. Playtime Theatre, Inc., 475 U.S. 41, 54 (1986) (citing Young v. American
Mini-Theaters, 427 U.S. 50, 78 (1976) (Powell, J., concurring)).
239. See Village of Belle Terre v. Boraas, 416 U.S. 1, 9-10 (1979) (admitting the regula-
tion's impact on Boraas's property values but discounting its constitutional significance).
240. See supra notes 225-226 and accompanying text.
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might be so slight as to be damnum absque injuria and thus not com-
pensable under the Takings Clause.241 If the value reduction is so
slight that compensation is not owing, it is hard to suggest that the
regulation impacts on mobility.242 Without that impact there is little
reason for the Court to distinguish takings claims from other individ-
ual liberties claims where state autonomy is considered in determin-
ing whether state action has violated the Fourteenth Amendment.243
To review, we can intuit that some amount of cost imposed by
land use regulation, maybe less than a complete "wipe-out," will be so
significant that exit opportunities are indeed illusory. In that case,
deference to local policy making will merely exacerbate the harm by
increasing "demoralization costs." We also know that some regulatory
costs are so slight as to have no effect on mobility. In that instance,
there is no unfairness to the landowner from the Court's deferring to
the rational conclusions of local legislatures regarding the amount of
individual sacrifice that can be demanded of its citizens in the name
of the "general welfare." Between those two extremes, can the Court
decide where any given regulation falls? More specifically, can the
Court determine that a fifty percent reduction in the speculative value
of A's farm24 4 is sufficient to remove local autonomy concerns from
241. See EPSTEIN, TAKINGS, supra note 25, at 102 ("The basic point is that where those
diminutions are not so overwhelmingly large, the harm suffered by the individual land-
owner should be regarded as damnum absque injuria, and hence not compensable by the
state." (footnote omitted)). Epstein, however, argued that simply because the monetary
impact of a regulation is so slight that no compensation is due does not mean that no
taking has occurred; it has. There is, however, no monetary remedy. See id. at 103 (ex-
plaining that, for example, in cases that "deal with .. .competition or the blocking of a
view, the extent of the damages is quite immaterial," but that such cases still concern, "[b]y
any theory... the loss of property rights"); see also Suitum v. Tahoe Reg'l Planning Agency,
520 U.S. 725, 746-50 (1997) (Scalia, J., concurring in part and concurring in the judg-
ment). Epstein is correct as a conceptual matter. On the other hand, because compensa-
tion is the only constitutionally prescribed remedy for a taking, it would be a hollow victory
indeed for a plaintiff to spend the money to litigate a takings claim only to discover that his
victory carried with it nothing but the joy of principle vindication.
242. See, e.g., FISCHEL, REGULATORY TAKINGS, supra note 8, at 271 (noting the problem of
a landowner's inability to "withdraw immobile assets from jurisdictions whose laws threaten
to devalue those assets").
243. See, e.g., Paul v. Davis, 424 U.S. 693, 710 (1976).
244. I use the phrase speculative value because that is what it is. Prior to the Village's
discussion of what to do with their excess water and sewage treatment capacity, A's prop-
erty would presumably be valued at its current use, agricultural. It is only because single
family home development may be on the horizon that the value has increased. Some states
have enacted special provisions to allow agricultural land at its use value as opposed to its
market value as developable land. See, e.g., OHIO REv. CODE ANN. §§ 5713.31-37 (Anderson
1994) (stating that "an owner of agricultural land may file an application with the county
auditor of the county in which such land is located, requesting the auditor to value the
land for real property tax purposes at the current value such land has for agricultural
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the balancing equation? How, if at all, does the Court account for the
fact that the farm is still profitable, meaning that it is returning a "fair
return" on investment? Would it matter if, because the farm has been
in the family for generations, its sunk costs might have already been
recovered thus making the proposed zoning changes much like an
ordinance that requires removal of a nonconforming use?245 I do not
think that the Court is any more capable of answering those and simi-
lar questions about how much cost is too much than it is in determin-
ing the "degree of necessity" that will sustain Congress's exercise of its
commerce powers. 246 The Court is thus left with the choice of choos-
ing between extremes. It can either assume that all regulatory costs
imposed on land restrict mobility, meaning that values of local auton-
omy are irrelevant to takings claims, or that federalism requires defer-
ence to local land use decisions whatever the cost imposed on the
landowner. Neither choice is terribly satisfactory because both, in
their own way, ignore mobility as the sine qua non for deferring (or not
deferring) to local policy making. The only sensible way out is for the
Court to avoid the problem altogether by limiting Lucas to its lan-
guage. Only those regulations that deprive the landowner of all eco-
nomic value will justify a lack of deference to local determinations of
harm. In all other cases, local land use regulations, at least those that
do not amount to a physical taking, 24 7 should be judged according to
the standard used in Rodriguez, Belle Terre, Renton, etc.-rational
basis.248
use"). Moreover, the market value increase in A's farmland is a windfall. Nothing he did
increased the land's value. It was public action or the hope of public action that is to
"blame."
245. Ordinances that require removal of nonconforming uses have been upheld against
takings claims when they allow enough time for the landowner to recover his investment
and a reasonable return thereon. See, e.g., New Castle v. Rollins Outdoor Adver., Inc., 475
A.2d 355, 359 (Del. 1984) (en banc) (finding that "the forced termination of a noncon-
forming use over a specified period of time is a reasonable exercise of the police power
and does not constitute a taking of property").
246. See McCulloch v. Maryland, 17 U.S. (4 Wheat.) 316, 423 (1819). But see Penn-
sylvania Coal Co. v. Mahon, 260 U.S. 393, 415 (1922) (finding that regulations that go "too
far" may be considered takings).
247. See Dolan v. City of Tigard, 512 U.S. 374, 399 (1994) (regarding a conditional ap-
proval granted to pave a parking lot in exchange for making a public greenway and pedes-
trian bicycle pathway); Nollan v. California Coastal Comm'n, 483 U.S. 825, 831-37 (1987)
(conditioning a permit to build on the granting of a public easement); Kaiser Aetna v.
United States, 444 U.S. 164, 170-80 (1979) (changing a private pond to a public navigable
waterway).
248. See Renton v. Playtime Theatre, Inc., 475 U.S. 41, 50 (1985); Village of Belle Terre




III. FEDERALISM AND THE PROBLEM OF EXCLUSION
The group so far ignored is potential purchasers whose views
have no voice in the policy formulation of local legislative bodies. For
those who, like Professor Epstein, view the Takings Clause as prohibit-
ing all uncompensated wealth transfers, the problem is that non-
nuisance preventing zoning raises the cost of housing of some to
confer private benefits on others.249 The Takings Clause ought to
protect against this form of rent seeking legislation. Those who view
the Takings Clause as a process-based counterweight to an inherently
self-serving legislature 25' also conclude that vigorous enforcement of
the Takings Clause is necessary to protect those who have no ability to
protect themselves. AsJustice Scalia pointed out in Lucas, it is too easy
for a local governing body to recite a variety of "harms" posed by any
development plan simply to mask discrimination against racial and
ethnic minorities, people whose religious views do not fit the main-
stream of the community or, more generally, those who are not per-
ceived as "fitting in."251  The question, however, is whether it is
necessary to federalize the law of property through the Takings Clause
to protect those interests. It is not that the Takings Clause is terribly
ill-suited to protecting the interests of the disenfranchised. Indeed,
the NewJersey Supreme Court, in providing for a builders' remedy to
contest the exclusion of minorities and the poor resulting from large
lot zoning, minimum floor area requirements and the like, properly
recognized that landowners and housing producers can be effective
surrogate advocates for the those nonresidents excluded by a commu-
nity's land use decisions. 252 Rather, given the federalism objections
249. See supra notes 233-234, 241 and accompanying text.
250. See FISCHEL, REGULATORY TAKINGS, supra note 8, at 131-35, 251-52 (stating that "in-
dependent judicial review of legislation . . . is a protection for popular sovereignty over
time"); Treanor, supra note 76, at 873-74, 887 (arguing that judicial review offers proce-
dural protection to minority groups). There is no doubt that their concerns are legitimate.
See 2 ANDERSON, supra note 2, at §§ 8.01-8.03 (discussing "[t]he use of governmental power
to protect private interests by preserving the status quo, at the expense of preventing the
solution of problems which involve the public welfare"); Lawrence Gene Sager, Tight Little
Islands: Exclusionary Zoning Equal Protection and the Indigent, 21 STAN. L. REv. 767, 780-98
(1969) (arguing that the problem with the "due process approach" is that "[i]t is an equa-
tion formulated to express and resolve the tension between the interests of the planning
policy and the individual landowner; what it omits is the interest of the low- or moderate-
income households whose access to the area is banned by the zoning ordinance in
question").
251. See Lucas v. South Carolina Coastal Council, 505 U.S. 1003, 1025-26, 1025 n.12
(1992) (insisting that the "Takings Clause requires courts to do more than insist upon
artful harm-preventing characterizations").
252. See Southern Burlington County NAACP v. Township of Mount Laurel (II), 456
A.2d 390, 452-53 (N.J. 1983) (finding that a builder's remedy was available on a case-by-
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raised above, the Takings Clause is not needed for this purpose. State
law, if utilized appropriately, is adequate to protect those whose voices
are largely ignored.
To start with, those to whom the Court has extended the full
mantle of judicial protections, racial, ethnic, and religious minorities,
do not need the Takings Clause. The Fourteenth Amendment pro-
tects against the use of zoning as an intentional device to exclude ra-
cial and ethnic minorities.2 5' Additionally, Title VIII of the Civil
Rights Act of 1968254 protects against zoning that has the effect of
excluding racial minorities.
255
Admittedly, there remains a wide gap in the protective blanket
provided by federal law. Neither the Fourteenth Amendment nor Ti-
tle VIII will have any impact on the proposed zoning like that de-
scribed in the preceding part. Depending upon racial and economic
demographics of the surrounding area, the effect of the proposed
zoning changes on racial and on ethnic minorities or, indeed, on
those trapped by poverty in inner-city neighborhoods, whatever their
racial or ethnic background, is problematic at best. Consequently, the
only federal protection for those excluded from residing in our hypo-
thetical township is the surrogate remedy afforded by the Takings
Clause. Assuming for purposes of argument that those who can af-
ford, for example, a four bedroom home on upwards of two acres of
case basis); Home Builders League v. Township of Berlin, 405 A.2d 381, 384-85 (N.J. 1979)
(granting standing to challenge exclusionary zoning to a builders' trade association and
three individual builders).
253. See Village of Arlington Heights v. Metropolitan Hous. Dev. Corp., 429 U.S. 252,
265-66 (1977) (requiring proof that a discriminatory purpose was a motivating factor). See
generally Daniel R. Mandelker, Racial Discrimination and Exclusionary Zoning: A Perspective on
Arlington Heights, 55 TEX. L. REv. 1217, 1219-23 (1977) (explaining the extent to which
the Fourteenth Amendment's prohibition of racial discrimination forbids exclusionary mu-
nicipal zoning). This is not to underestimate the difficulty of demonstrating that any given
zoning ordinance or land use plan is intentionally designed to limit residency by racial and
ethnic minorities. Indeed, it is just that difficulty which seemingly moved Professor
Treanor in the direction of the Takings Clause to remedy the problem of environmental
racism. See Treanor, supra note 76, at 875-78 (stating that the "[] imitation of heightened
Takings Clause scrutiny of governmental actions that affect discrete and insular minorities
to environmental justice cases cabins the judiciary's ability to overturn majoritarian deci-
sions"). It is not, however, impossible. See United States v. City of Parma, 494 F. Supp.
1049, 1097-1101 (N.D. Ohio 1980) (holding that actions by city officials were done to per-
petuate the city's all-white character), affid, 661 F.2d 562 (6th Cir. 1981).
254. 42 U.S.C. § 3614 (1994).
255. SeeUnited States v. City of Blackjack, 508 F.2d 1179, 1184 (8th Cir. 1974) (finding
that tide VIII prohibits discrimination "in the field of housing"), cert. denied, 422 U.S. 1042
(1975); see also Richard Thompson Ford, The Boundaries of Race: Political Geography in Legal
Analysis, 107 HARV. L. REv. 1841, 1894 (1994) (noting that the Fair Housing Act "applies to
[bar discrimination by] both governmental entities and private interests").
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land need the courts to provide the voice that they are denied, why
must the courts be federal courts and why must that protection be the
Takings Clause? Why are not state remedies adequate?
A number of states have held that local zoning must look beyond
the boundaries of any particular local government to the region of
which it is a part. The theories supporting that requirement track
along two lines. New Jersey and Pennsylvania rely on state individual
liberties restraints to limit a local community's zoning authority.25 6 In
the famous (or infamous as the case may be) Mt. Laurel litigation,257
the NewJersey Supreme Court held that Article I of that state's consti-
tution2 58 created a substantive due process and equal protection right
to affordable housing and that a community had a regional responsi-
bility to make that right a reality by contributing their "fair share" of
low and moderate income housing.259 In Pennsylvania, the court re-
lied on what appeared to be a substantive due process rationale to
strike down a four acre zoning restriction.26 ° In doing so, it noted
that communities may not "prevent the entrance of newcomers in or-
der to avoid future burdens, economic and otherwise. '"261
Other jurisdictions, such as New York and New Hampshire, have
relied more generally on proper police power authority to demand
that communities consider the housing needs of those who reside be-
yond their borders. The New Hampshire Supreme Court relied on
the state's zoning enabling act to hold that the "community," which
zoning regulations must look to is not limited by the boundaries of
the regulating municipality; it must consider not only what is good for
their own residents but the housing needs of potential residents who
256. See infra notes 257-261 and accompanying text.
257. Southern Burlington County NAACP v. Township of Mount Laurel (I), 336 A.2d
713 (N.J. 1975).
258. Article I of New Jersey's Constitution states: "All persons are by nature free and
independent, and have certain natural and unalienable rights, among which are those of
enjoying and defending life and liberty, of acquiring, possessing, and protecting property,
and of pursuing and obtaining safety and happiness." N.J. CONST. of 1947, art. I, 1.
259. See Southern Burlington County NAACP, 336 A.2d at 734 (finding that Mount Laurel
must fulfill "its fair share of the regional need for low and moderate income housing").
260. See National Land & Inv. Co. v. Kohn, 215 A.2d 597, 612-13 (Pa. 1965); see infta note
261.
261. Kohn, 215 A.2d at 612. Five years later the Pennsylvania Supreme Court struck
down two and three acre zoning on the same substantive due process theory. SeeAppeal of
Kit-Mar Builders, Inc. 268 A.2d 764, 769-70 (Pa. 1970); see also Kasparek v.Johnson County
Bd. of Health, 288 N.W.2d 511, 513 (Iowa 1980) (en banc) (striking down, for the same
reasons, a requirement to have a five acre tract to install a septic tank); Board of County
Supervisors v. Carper, 107 S.E.2d 390, 396 (Va. 1959) (striking down two acre zoning on
the same theory).
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reside in other political subdivisions.2 62 New York relied more gener-
ally on police power principles in Berenson v. New Castle263 to hold that
a community's zoning plan must balance its needs against the impact
of its land use proposals on people and localities in the broader re-
gion. 264 The lesson from these cases is that the Takings Clause is not
needed to provide a surrogate voice to those potential housing con-
sumers who are excluded by a community's land use policies.
Admittedly, state constitutional and statutory attempts at forcing
local governments to recognize their obligations to the broader re-
gion are highly imperfect. First, the reach of these cases is limited in
terms of the uses excluded. Berenson, for example, upheld an ordi-
nance that limited growth of a suburb in Westchester County except
for the restriction on multifamily dwellings.26 5 Five years later, the
New York Court of Appeals upheld five acre residential zoning be-
cause there was no proof that the municipality either intentionally ac-
ted to exclude low and moderate income persons or did not in fact
consider the housing needs of the broader region. 266 Second, those
protected by these rulings would appear to be limited to low and mod-
erate income persons, a far narrower category of individuals than
would be protected under the conventional Takings Clause jurispru-
dence. On the other hand, limiting judicial protection to low and
moderate income individuals may simply reflect a widespread intuitive
sense of who can fend for themselves, economically and/or politically,
and who cannot.
Most problematic with state court approaches has been the rem-
edy. Volumes have been written criticizing the New Jersey court's
"take-over" of local government zoning in that state. 26 7 As a result,
262. See Britton v. Town of Chester, 595 A.2d 492, 495-96, 498 (N.H. 1991) (finding that
the zoning ordinance "was never conceived to be a device to facilitate the use of govern-
mental power to prevent access to a municipality by 'outsiders of any disadvantaged social
or economic group'" (quoting Beck v. Town of Raymond, 394 A.2d 847, 852 (1978))).
263. 341 N.E.2d 236 (N.Y. 1979).
264. See id. at 241-43 ("Our concern is not whether the zones, in themselves, are bal-
anced communities, but whether the town itself, as provided for by its zoning ordinances,
will be a balanced and integrated community.").
265. See id. at 243.
266. See Robert E. Kurzius, Inc. v. Incorporated Village of Upper Brookville, 414 N.E.2d
680, 684-85 (N.Y. 1980) (holding that the plaintiffs did not meet their burden "of proving
exclusionary purpose or noncompliance with the Berenson criteria").
267. See, e.g., John M. Payne, Re-thinking Fair Share: The Judicial Enforcement of Affordable
Housing Policies, 16 REAL EsT. L.J. 20, 27-32 (1987) (criticizing the judicial forum for inter-
vention); Ronald H. Silverman, Housing for All Under Law: The Limits of Legalist Reform, 27
UCLA L. Rev. 99, 111-30 (1979) (arguing that cases, such as the Mount Laurel case dis-
cussed supra, "challenge ... [the courts'] ability to assess cost and more intangible conse-
quences or impacts"); Developments in the Law-Zoning, 91 HARv. L. REv. 1427, 1694-1708
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both the New Hampshire court in Britton268 and the post-Berenson New
York court 26 9 have declined to enter the remedial thicket traversed by
NewJersey. 2v° No doubt a broad reading of the Takings Clause advo-
cated by Professors Epstein, Fischel and others would eliminate the
difficulties posed by on-going judicial supervision of local zoning.
Either the regulation is a taking or it is not. If it is, the municipality
owes the landowner compensation up to the point that the regulation
is changed. The voice of the unrepresented is thus heard without em-
broiling the judiciary in constant supervision of a recalcitrant local
polity. The same is true, however, of the Pennsylvania court's state
constitutional due process approach in Kohn, in which the Penn-
sylvania Supreme Court declared four acre zoning to be a violation of
Pennsylvania's due process clause. 271 Moreover, the Pennsylvania ap-
proach permits the kind of balancing of community welfare and re-
gional housing needs that is necessary if protection of unrepresented
nonresidents is to be anything more than a make-weight argument for
a strict (nonbalancing) application of the Takings Clause.2 72 And the
balancing is done by a state court, presumably more familiar than a
federal court with how that balance ought to be drawn. 27 3
(1978) (arguing that it is difficult for courts to fashion remedies on a larger than local
level); Note, The Inadequacy of Judicial Remedies in Cases of Exclusionary Zoning, 74 MICH. L.
REv. 760, 760-64 (1976) (stating that the legislature is better than the courts to provide
relief). After eleven years, the NewJersey Supreme Court removed the state judiciary from
the supervision of local zoning plans when it upheld the New Jersey Fair Housing Act as
being consistent with the goals established by the court in Mt. Laurel (I). See Hills Dev. Co.
v. Township of Bernards, 510 A.2d 621, 654-55 (N.J. 1986) (transferring "any Mount Laurel
action hereafter commenced except where the Act clearly calls for retention"). In addition
to the debate about judicial supervision of local zoning plans, economists conducted their
own debate about whether any remedy at all ought to be provided for so-called exclusion-
ary zoning. That debate, centering around efficiency costs imposed on existing residents by
judicial requirements opening up communities to housing for low and moderate income
persons, housing prices, and monopoly behavior by local governments, is well beyond the
scope of this paper. Suffice it to say that limiting local zoning authority under a broad
reading of the Takings Clause would seem to raise the same kinds of efficiency issues. For
a bibliography of the published commentary see DANIEL R. MANDELKER & ROGER A. CUN-
NINGHAM, PLANNING AND CONTROL OF LAND DEVELOPMENT 373-75 (4th ed. 1995).
268. Britton v. Town of Chester, 595 A.2d 492, 497 (N.H. 1991) (refusing to adopt the
Mt. Laurel analysis because of its "arbitrary mathematical quotas").
269. Suffolk Hous. Servs. v. Town of Brookhaven, 511 N.E.2d 67, 70-71 (N.Y. 1987)
(holding that unless the plaintiff has presented a specific housing plan, no judicial relief
can be provided, even if the zoning plan might otherwise be exclusionary).
270. See supra note 267 and accompanying text.
271. See supra notes 260-261 and accompanying text.
272. See National Land & Inv. Co. v. Kohn, 215 A.2d 597, 609-10 (Pa. 1965) (viewing
zoning as a means to plan for the future).
273. See id. at 601-02.
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Finally, the claim that the Takings Clause is necessary to protect
the voice of nonresidents rings strange when applied to small homo-
geneous communities like the hypothetical township described above.
These communities are less likely to possess home rule authority than
their larger and more heterogeneous counterparts to whose land use
policy judgments process theorists like Professor Fischel are willing to
defer. Consequently, the zoning authority of these smaller and more
suspect communities derives not from sources like charters, that may
be immune from state legislative revision or override, but from zoning
enabling laws enacted by the state legislature. Additionally, what the
state legislature gives, it can take away. Even if some small homogene-
ous communities, villages for example, do possess home rule author-
ity,274 if their zoning has the external impact claimed, they would not
be shielded from preemptive state legislation in any event.275 Nonres-
idents, both developers and prospective housing consumers, are cer-
tainly represented in pluralistic state capitals where the ability to form
274. See, e.g., OHIO CONST. of 1851, art. XVIII, §§ 1, 3 (1912) (classifying municipal cor-
porations as either cities or villages, and granting both categories "authority to exercise all
powers of local self-government").
275. See, e.g., Denver v. Colorado, 788 P.2d 764, 767 (Colo. 1990) (finding that in mat-
ters of statewide concern, the state legislature may adopt legislation and preempt the
power of home rule municipalities); Kelley v. McGee, 443 N.E.2d 908, 913-15 (N.Y. 1982)
(holding that home rule provisions do not operate to restrict the state legislature in acting
upon matters of statewide concern); Garcia v. Siffrin Residential Ass'n, 407 N.E.2d 1369,
1377 (Ohio 1980) (deciding that the enactment of zoning laws by a municipality may not
conflict with the general laws of the state); City of La Grande v. Public Employees Retire-
ment Bd., 576 P.2d 1204, 1211 (Or. 1978) (en banc) (finding that state legislation can
preempt a home rule ordinance if the subject is of state wide concern); Humphrey v. City
of Phoenix, 102 P.2d 82, 88 (Ariz. 1940) (finding that general state laws pertaining to
matters of statewide concern override conflicting city charters). See generally OSBORNE M.
REYNOLDS, JR., LOCAL GOVERNMENT LAw 536-39 (1982) (discussing local restrictions). It is
conceivable then, that in any dispute over whether a local zoning ordinance constitutes a
taking, there is a potential state law issue about whether the local regulating government
has exceeded the authority delegated to it either by the state's constitutional or statutory
home rule provisions or its zoning enabling act. Where there exists a question of which
level of state government possesses the authority exercised, the Supreme Court has held
that lower federal courts should abstain, pending an authoritative interpretation of state
law by the state courts. See Louisiana Light & Power Co. v. City of Thibodaux, 360 U.S. 25,
28-29 (1959) (noting that when a case "concerns the apportionment of governmental pow-
ers between City and State," it is more proper for a federal judge to "ascertain the meaning
of a disputed state statute from ... the Courts of the State" than to "himself make a dubi-
ous and tentative forecast."); see also Colorado River Water Conservation Dist. v. United
States, 424 U.S. 800, 814 (1976) (plurality opinion) (stating that an abstention is required
"where there [has] been presented difficult questions of state law bearing on policy
problems of substantial public import").
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alliances with other pro-development interest groups could negate
any majoritarian bias that might exist at the local level.2 76
CONCLUSION
Professor Rose is unquestionably correct when she pleads that the
Takings Clause must be interpreted so as to find an acceptable bal-
ance between the property rights of landowners and the ability of lo-
cal communities to conserve what is probably the community's most
valuable resource-land. 277 Yet, the Supreme Court in Lucas does not
recognize any role for deference to local land use policy when inter-
preting the Takings Clause. While it is true that the Court may allow
some room for deference when a land use regulation does not extract
all the land's economic value, there are indications that it is only one
or two votes away from extending the presumptive takings holding of
Lucas to cases in which substantially less than all economic value is
taken. Lower federal courts, by tinkering with the denominator of the
regulated land fraction, are already well down that road.
276. This is not an argument that Justice Harlan was correct and that the Court was
wrong when it extended the one-person/one-vote requirement to local governments in
Avery v. Midland County, 390 U.S. 474 (1968). Given the breadth of local governing author-
ity, even under a statutory delegation of authority to legislate for the health, safety, and
welfare of the community, see State v. Hutchinson, 624 P.2d 1116, 1126 (Utah 1980)
("When the State has granted general welfare power to local governments, those govern-
ments have independent authority apart from, and in addition to, specific grants of author-
ity to pass ordinances which are reasonably and appropriately related to the objectives of
that power ...."), it is unreasonable to require individuals to go to the state legislature
every time they think that a local government is acting improperly. In fact, a state's consti-
tutional provision prohibiting special legislation might bar piecemeal recourse to the state
legislature. See REYNOLDS, supra note 275, at 85-88. The argument, rather, is that the state
legislature, by general law, is fully able to ensure that local zoning gives voice to the inter-
ests of those outside its boundaries. See generally State Sponsored Growth Management as a
Remedy for Exclusionary Zoning, 108 HARv. L. REV. 1127, 1128 (1995) (suggesting that "state-
sponsored growth-management statutes . . . might be used to counter exclusionary
zoning").
277. See Rose, Takings, Federalism, Norms, supra note 24, at 1148 (stating that "takings
jurisprudence has to take into account communities' need to deal with shrinking re-
sources."). Property absolutists, like Richard Epstein, do not even make an attempt to
achieve that balance. For him, governments are established to protect an individual's pri-
vate property, not to diminish it. The only benchmark for deciding whether it is doing one
or the other is the common law. Process theorists, like William Fischel, wink at a balance
by their willingness to approve zoning changes that reflect the community's norm. That is,
however, more of an accommodation to a landowner's investment-backed expectations
than it is to a community's ability to respond to increasing urbanization pressures. More-
over, the analytical shift from the substance of the proposed land use regulation to a set of
a priori assumptions about the ability of political minorities to have their views accounted
for necessarily ignores the substantive legitimacy of the land use policies formulated.
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My argument is that the failure to account for the state's interest
in protecting its citizens from nonnuisance-related harms (or even
granting them the benefits of a variety of "lifestyle" amenities) is both
normatively improper and inconsistent with the Court's approach to
analyzing the scope of nonproperty-based individual liberties claims,
textual and nontextual alike. Even accepting that landed property
rights ought not to be treated as a constitutional stepchild, there is no
reason to treat them as the constitutional patriarch (or matriarch).
The proposal is simple. Retain the presumptive takings rule of Lucas.
All other land use regulations, excepting those that are true physical
takings, should be judged according to a rational basis standard. This
is not a call to return to the "muddle-creating," ad hoc balancing test
of Penn CentraL.2 78 It is only an appeal that the Court apply to property
rights the same distinction it seems to apply to other rights, even so-
called fundamental rights-the distinction between the imposition of
a cost and a denial of the right.
278. Despite all of the apparent dissatisfaction with the indeterminacy of Penn Centrats
ad hoc balancing, the Court has not abandoned that approach. See Concrete Pipe &
Prods., Inc. v. Construction Laborers Pension Trust, 508 U.S. 602, 641-47 (1993) (applying
a Penn Central style balancing test to a claim of taking of property rights under a pension
plan). Indeed, Professors Heller and Krier argued that the Supreme Court's "muddle" of
the Takings Clause has continued more or less unabated since Mahon in 1922. See Michael
A. Heller & James E. Krier, Deterrence and Distribution in the Law of Takings, 112 HARv. L.
REV. 997, 1022-24 (1999) (explaining that the "demolition" of the Takings Clause has been
the Court's doing for the last seventy-five years).
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